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The Canterbury dairy industry has grown significantly in the past several decades in both the 
number of cows being milked and effective farming area. The industry has seen substantial 
growth in farm size, productivity and intensity. These increases have the potential to 
significantly impact the environment. Environmental regulations were implemented under the 
Resource Management Act (1991) to limit and mitigate the impacts of agricultural production, 
among other sectors. Compliance with environmental regulation as it pertains to effluent 
management on Canterbury dairy farms for the past several seasons has remained around 70 
per cent upon first inspection. This research examines the factors influencing effluent consent 
compliance and the impact of their relationship on compliance. Understanding the factors 
influencing compliance behaviour is key to further developing efficient and effective 
regulation. 
An email-based electronic questionnaire collected quantitative data from Canterbury dairy 
effluent consent holders. The questionnaire was distributed to 513 consent holders, representing 
approximately 70 per cent of consents, for whom valid email addresses were available. A 14 
per cent response rate was achieved. Data was analysed utilising SPSS 23.   
The results reveal insights into consent holder attitudes and perceptions and provide 11 
statistically significant relationships between explanatory variables and compliance levels in 
the bivariate analysis and four significant relationships in the logistic regression analysis. These 
explanatory variables included: training workshop and farm group meeting attendance; farm 
size; amount of milking livestock on farm; the response to which group in society should have 
the primary responsibility of managing the environment sustainably; perception of the ease of 
access to information on compliance requirements; the perceived impact of non-compliance on 
reputation; the perceived ease with which the regulatory agency can detect non-compliance; the 
rating given for the regulatory process and inspections; historical non-compliance; and 
confidence in their ability and intention to comply at their next inspection.  
 ii  
  
Recommendations provided to ensure a high level of, and an increase in compliance included 
an updated compliance rating system, leveraging communication tools and the ongoing 
development of a collaborative and education-focused strategy.     
Keywords: New Zealand, Canterbury, dairy industry, environmental regulation, compliance, 
compliance behaviour, effluent.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Research background  
Dairy farming practices in the Canterbury region have shifted over the last several decades to 
relatively more intensive systems that rely more heavily on irrigation (Environment Canterbury, 
2015b). Farm size and cows per herd in the region have grown to twice the New Zealand 
average, with Canterbury farms grazing 21 per cent more cows per hectare than the national 
average and holding 18 percent of the national herd (DairyNZ Limited, 2015).   
In the past decade, cow numbers in Canterbury have increased 182 per cent – representative of 
continued growth in the industry nationwide (DairyNZ Limited, 2015). This increasing scale 
and intensification of the dairy industry nationally has generated concern from the public, 
government and consumers about the consumption and deterioration in quality of fresh water. 
The dairy industry is a major player in the New Zealand economy – one of the largest export 
earners at $14 billion NZD annually (Ministry for Primary Industries, 2015). Consequently, 
debates have ensued on how to appropriately balance environmental protection and economic 
viability. 
Twenty-five per cent of the population of New Zealand served by community drinking water 
sources receive water that is not microbiologically safe (Community and Public Health, 2012). 
Notably, farming activities can accelerate water pollution via nutrient (nitrogen and 
phosphorus) loading, resulting in negative impacts on the environment and human health 
(Carpenter, et al., 1998). The Ministry for the Environment (2015) estimates that between 1990 
and 2012, nitrogen leached from agricultural production increased 29 per cent, with the main 
causes cited as increased dairy cattle numbers and use of nitrogen fertiliser. High concentrations 
of nitrogen and phosphorus can lead to oxygen depletion in bodies of water, making them 
uninhabitable (United Nations Environment Programme, 2016). The abundance of native 
freshwater fish is an indicator of the health of New Zealand’s streams, wetlands and lakes (Tipa 
& Teirney, 2006). In 2013, 74 per cent of New Zealand’s native freshwater fish were labelled 
‘threatened’ or ‘at risk’ – a nine per cent increase since 2009 (Department of Conservation, 
2013). This increase in the decline of freshwater fish populations reveals a failure to protect 
ecosystem integrity, largely due to agricultural expansion and intensification (Baskaran, Cullen 
& Colombo, 2009).  
Environment Canterbury’s (ECAN) November 2012 groundwater survey (as cited in Young, 
2013), found nitrate levels increasing upwards of 30 per cent in wells that were tested in the 
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past 10 years: notably, 20 wells in the Ashburton region exceeded safe nitrate levels for human 
consumption. High levels of nitrate in drinking water can cause serious, often fatal illnesses 
that can be acquired or result in congenital defects (Canterbury District Health Board, 2013). 
Life-threatening methemoglobinemia in infants is one possible outcome – an inhibition of the 
ability to incorporate oxygen in their blood (United Nations Environment Programme, 2016). 
Toxins in drinking water produced through water pollution can affect the nervous, digestive, 
respiratory and cutaneous systems (World Health Organization, 2002). New Zealand has a high 
rate of waterborne diseases relative to other industrialised (OECD) countries: it is estimated 
that 18,000 – 34,000 people contract waterborne diseases annually (Environmental Science and 
Research Ltd., 2007; OECD, 2007). Additionally, methods for nitrate removal are limited - 
filters, boiling and chemical treatments are all insufficient (Canterbury District Health Board, 
2013). To assist in mitigating the detrimental impacts of nutrient loading, ECAN has developed 
a water and land management strategy in an attempt to limit leaching and run-off, among other 
activities that negatively impact the environment.  
Monaghan, et al. (2007) noted research conducted worldwide over the past three decades 
demonstrates that the amount of nitrate excreted by animals is the leading determinant of 
nitrogen losses from pastoral farms. Monaghan et al. (2007), suggest nutrient management 
principles are developing to include a greater emphasis on innovations aiming to minimise 
nutrient losses. This suggests improvements in water quality could be achieved by adopting 
‘best management practices’ that may also provide economic opportunities (Monaghan et al., 
2007).  
Despite scientific evidence on the impact agricultural production has on water quality, a recent 
study by Austin (2014) found that Canterbury farmers in the Waimakariri catchment exhibited 
a mix of denial and lack of understanding about the impact their farming activities have on 
water quality and the concomitant impact water quality has on human health. This result is 
consistent with studies performed in Switzerland and Scotland that concluded farmers rarely 
considered environmental issues beyond their farms’ fence lines, unless they affect their 
individual productivity or profit margins (Bratt, 2002; Macgregor & Warren, 2006). Farmers 
did not feel they were responsible for water quality issues or environmental degradation 
linkages between their catchments and nearby waterways. Most farmers surveyed by Austin 
(2014) reported a lack of knowledge regarding nutrient losses restricted their understanding of 
how their practices contributed to the issues surrounding groundwater and surface water quality.   
In contrast, Duncan (2014) interviewed farmers in the Hurunui Waiau zone of North 
Canterbury, who demonstrated understanding of their local water quality issues. This farmer 
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group did not object to the nutrient limits being imposed on farm, as long as they were perceived 
to be equitable and not substantially affect farm viability or profitability (Duncan, 2014). 
Respondents all considered their own farm’s contribution to the deterioration of water quality 
as minimal or within a reasonable range – individually, their role in local water quality 
degradation is negligible (Duncan, 2014). As is common with nonpoint source pollution, 
individually their role is minor, but collectively, the impact can be extensive. Farmers’ 
understanding could impact the implementation of good management practices expected by 
regional governments, as they must work collectively to address the problem (Duncan, 2014). 
Achieving consensus on what the problem is and who is responsible for its amelioration, is 
fundamental to regulatees being persuaded (1) there is a need to change and (2) they then must 
act on this understanding (Blackstock, Ingrahm, Burton, Brown & Slee, 2010).   
Since these studies were conducted, ECAN’s regulatory processes have changed. Its water and 
land management strategy and monitoring systems continue to evolve, along with farmers’ 
knowledge. Critical to this process is understanding how regulatees make decisions about 
compliance as a pre-condition for designing an effective regulatory system.   
The nutrient management section of Canterbury’s Land and Water Regional Plan (LWRP) 
became operative on September 1, 2015 (Environment Canterbury, 2015a). The LWRP requires 
all farming operations (over five hectares) to monitor and record modelled nutrient losses. 
Farming activities must achieve the nutrient load limit allowance for their specific catchment 
(region within Canterbury) and farm operators must prepare a Farm Environment Plan (FEP) 
to identify and deliver on sound environmental practices across a range of farming activities 
(Environment Canterbury, 2015a). The LWRP requires that farming operations adopt:   
the best practicable options to minimise the loss of nutrients from farming activities in 
areas where region-wide water quality outcomes are at risk of not being met, including 
nutrient loss management, efficient and effective use of water for irrigation, riparian 
management, stock movements across waterways, offal and farm rubbish pits, the 
storage and application of effluent and fertiliser use (Environment Canterbury, 2015a, 
p. 63).   
The referenced ‘options’ are set out in a list of industry agreed good management practices  
[‘Matrix of Good Management’ (MGM)], that all farmers are expected to operate under 
following Phase Two of the project targeted for completion by 2017 (Environment Canterbury, 
2015c). 
In the 2013-14 season, 792 farms or 72 per cent recorded full compliance with the conditions 
of their dairy effluent discharge consents in Canterbury (Environment Canterbury, 2014a). 
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Two-hundred and five (205) farms had minor non-compliance: a three per cent decrease over 
the previous season (Environment Canterbury, 2014b). Significant non-compliance totalled 8.8 
per cent (96 farms), an increase of 1.8 per cent over the previous season (Environment 
Canterbury, 2014b). Non-compliance was due primarily to effluent ponding and exceeding 
allowed application rates (60 per cent of cases); the number of cows being milked (exceeding 
the number allowable on consent); overflow of effluent from storage ponds; ponds not meeting 
consent requirements; farms not operating in accordance with their management plans; and 
discharging effluent outside the consented area (Environment Canterbury, 2014b).  
In the 2014-15 season, ECAN’s monitoring system changed. Previously, all operating dairy 
farms were monitored. In the 2014-15 season, only operating farms deemed at risk or with 
previous poor performance were assessed: 85 per cent of all operating dairy farms in the region 
(Environment Canterbury, 2015b). Of these 976 farms, 627 (64 per cent) were in full 
compliance with their effluent consents; 282 (29 per cent) had minor non-compliance; 63 (6.5 
per cent) were in significant non-compliance; and four farms (0.5 per cent) were unable to 
determine compliance (Environment Canterbury, 2015b). ECAN (2015b) states given a change 
in its monitoring system, comparing the percentages of the 2014-15 season to prior seasons is 
not recommended. Yet, on the assumption that the 15 per cent balance of farms not monitored 
were fully compliant, regional compliance would be 69.6 per cent: a decrease in compliance 
over the 2013-14 season of, at a minimum 2.4 per cent (Figure 1.1). Table 1.1 provides regional 
compliance statistics from Southland, the Bay of Plenty and Marlborough for comparison. Note 
that for Waikato, one of the largest milk producing regions, statistics were not easily available 
due to their monitoring system. 
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Figure 1.1 Per cent of fully compliant dairy farms in Canterbury: 2006-07 to 2014-15 (red line 
indicates change in monitoring system) (From: Environment Canterbury, 2015b, p. 18)  
 
Table 1.1 New Zealand compliance rates (Marlborough District Council, 2016; Bay of Plenty 
Regional Council, 2015; Environment Canterbury, 2015b; Environment Southland, 2015)  
Region Compliant  Minor (to marginal/ 
moderate) non-compliance  
Significant/major 
non-compliance  
Canterbury 
(2014-15)  
64 per cent  29 per cent  6.5 per cent 
Southland  
(2014-15)  
68 per cent  25 per cent  7 per cent  
Bay of Plenty  
(2014-15)  
72 per cent  25 per cent  2 per cent  
Marlborough 
(2014-15)  
70 per cent  16 per cent  14 per cent  
Marlborough 
(2015-16)  
73 per cent  9 per cent  18 per cent  
Bay of Plenty  
(2014-15):  
Forestry  
72 per cent   18 per cent  10 per cent  
Bay of Plenty  
(2014-15):  
Agricultural water 
use  
80 per cent  20 per cent  -  
  
Compliance ratings in the Southland, Bay of Plenty and Marlborough regions are assessed 
differently than in the Canterbury region, ranging from a grading system with four sections (A 
through D) or a five-point score (one, two, five, seven and ten). For comparison, the grading 
systems were amalgamated into the three-point system Canterbury currently uses: compliant, 
minor non-compliance and significant non-compliance. Southland has the largest number of 
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consents out of the comparison group (912 consents). Bay of Plenty has the second largest, but 
almost half the size of Canterbury, at 698 consents (agricultural water use: 919; forestry: 45).  
Marlborough had the smallest number of effluent consents (and significantly smaller than 
Canterbury) at 56 farms (Marlborough District Council, 2016; Environment Southland, 2015; 
Bay of Plenty Regional Council, 2015).  
1.2 Problem statement  
The dairy industry currently faces pressure to improve environmental performance while 
maintaining economic competitiveness. DairyNZ Limited (2011) advised that the future of 
dairy farming in New Zealand depends on the sector’s ability to reduce its environmental 
footprint, by adopting innovative techniques addressing effluent management and resource use 
efficiency challenges. However, research shows that the lack of adopting environmentally 
friendly practices stems from concerns over cost, complexity, compatibility and uncertainty of 
benefits (Monaghan et al., 2007). While ECAN has done significant work in creating 
partnerships with industry to promote environmentally sound practices (MGM is a prime 
example), today there is little empirical evidence of the factors on-farm influencing full 
resource consent compliance in the Canterbury region.  
The environmental issues and consequences relating to inadequate effluent management on 
dairy farms are well documented in the literature (Blackett & Le Heron, 2008; Meister, 
Beechey, Brouwer, Fox & Jongeneel, 2012). Despite that, very little is known about the factors, 
their inter-relationships and ultimate significance in influencing attainment of full dairy effluent 
discharge consent compliance in Canterbury.   
The objectives of this study are to firstly identify those factors that affect and thereby influence 
on-farm environmental compliance in the Canterbury region. Secondly, this study seeks to 
determine the impact of the identified factors on full ECAN dairy effluent discharge consent 
compliance. The results of the study provide recommendations to inform policy and industry 
stakeholders that target factors that increase compliance.    
1.3 Motivation for research 
A richer understanding of the motivating factors for full dairy effluent discharge consent 
compliance is extremely helpful for government agencies and the dairy industry as they work 
to guide all producers down a more sustainable production path. Non-compliance remains at 
approximately 30 per cent in Canterbury. Knowledge of how regulatees make decisions about 
compliance is a condition precedent to further development of an effective and efficient 
regulatory scheme. Insights gained from compliance research in Canterbury may facilitate the 
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design of effective systems in other regions within New Zealand. For many regions, proposed 
agro-environmental regulations and methods to minimise the environmental effects of nutrient 
losses are hotly debated (McCrone, 2015). An informed understanding how the central player 
– the consent holder – makes decisions about environmental compliance is a critical component 
in developing and evolving effectual regulatory systems nationwide.    
The balance of this thesis contains the following format:   
• Chapter 2 identifies and discusses theory and previous research relevant to this study, 
which assisted in the development of the framework used to guide this research.   
• Chapter 3 provides the research objectives and questions in detail.   
• Chapter 4 discusses the research methodology and design, as well as data collection and 
analysis.   
• Chapter 5 presents the data analysis results, detailing the relationships between 
compliance and framework constructs.   
• Chapter 6 draws on the results to present an integrated discussion, provide 
recommendations, outline future research opportunities and the current study limitations 
and conclusions. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature review 
This chapter provides an introduction to environmental legislation in New Zealand and 
Canterbury and the regulatory process, followed by a review of relevant theory and conceptual 
foundations for the study of behaviour. A review of empirical studies on the factors affecting 
behaviour towards a range of pro-environmental practices and compliance is provided in the 
chapter’s final section.  
2.1 Structure, features and motivation for farm environmental regulations in 
Canterbury 
This section discusses environmental legislation in New Zealand in general and Canterbury in 
particular. Key features of the regulatory framework relevant to understanding the compliance 
process are reviewed.   
2.1.1 Resource Management Act 1991  
The Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) is the central piece of national legislation for the 
sustainable management of New Zealand’s natural resources and environment. The RMA 
includes land (except as managed under the Conservation Act 1987), water and air (Ministry 
for the Environment, 2016c). As an integrated regulatory framework for managing natural and 
physical resources, the RMA was one of the world’s first governmental statutes incorporating 
the principle of sustainable management (Smith, 1997). The RMA charges regional councils 
and local governments with the responsibility to implement its objectives (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2016a).   
In addition to the role a regional council plays in implementing the RMA, councils must also 
work with and towards the objectives and policies set in any operative National Policy 
Statements (NPS). NPS are set on issues deemed nationally significant. There are currently four 
NPS issued under the RMA – Freshwater Management, Renewable Electricity Generation, 
Electricity Transmission and New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement (Ministry for the  
Environment, 2016b). Current NPS under development include Indigenous Biodiversity and 
Urban Development (Ministry for the Environment, 2016b). The RMA provides a set of 
planning instruments for managing national resources – the hierarchy and relationship is shown 
in Figure 2.1.  
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Figure 2.1 Hierarchy of planning instruments (From: Environment Canterbury, 2015a, p. 25)  
2.1.2 Local government responsibilities  
Local governments (regional and district councils) are given specific powers and duties they 
are to exercise under the RMA. Under Section 30, regional councils have functions concerning 
the control or use of any land for the purposes of soil conservation, water quality and quantity, 
ensuring the conservation of marine ecosystems, mitigating natural hazards and their 
consequences; and to prevent and mitigate the effects of hazardous substance use, storage, 
transport or disposal (Parliamentary Counsel Office, 2015). Regional councils have control over 
regional policy statements; identifying and monitoring contaminated land; planting decisions 
on river and lake margins; conservation of indigenous biological diversity; developing strategic 
infrastructure and land use (Parliamentary Counsel Office, 2015). Regional councils are 
responsible for issuing infringement and abatement notices to parties found non-compliant with 
the RMA and national or regional environmental statements and policies (Parliamentary 
Counsel Office, 2015). 
Under Section 31, district councils (Canterbury has 10) have more generalised controls over the 
effects of land use and development and protection of land resources (Parliamentary Counsel 
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Office, 2015). Regional and district councils must work closely to ensure both regional and 
district plans are harmonised.   
2.1.3 Canterbury Land and Water Regional Plan  
ECAN manages an area covering 4.53 million hectares of land - the largest of all regions in the 
country (Statistics New Zealand, 2011). ECAN has implemented the LWRP, identifying goals 
for resource management in Canterbury to promote the objectives set in the RMA (Environment 
Canterbury, 2015b). The LWRP provides policies and rules to achieve RMA aims and provides 
direction for resource consent applications and compliance. The LWRP also contains catchment 
(district) specific policies and rules for achieving region-wide objectives (Environment 
Canterbury, 2015a). 
All Sections of the LWRP (except Rules 
5.123-5.127 and 5.154-5.158) came into 
force December 1, 2015 (most sections 
operative from September 1, 2015) 
(Environment Canterbury, 2015a). Under the 
LWRP, regions are zoned for their water 
quality (Figure 2.2). Farm resource consents 
are evaluated for the amount of leaching per 
hectare (unless they are part of an irrigation 
scheme or a principal water supplier that 
holds a consent and if the farm is larger than 
5 hectares) (Environment Canterbury, 
2014b). Resource consents are required for 
all farming enterprises and any discharges of 
farm dairy effluent to land (Environment 
Canterbury, 2015a).  
In addition to the LWRP, ECAN developed a project (MGM) that identifies good management  
practices (GMP) for each sector with industry partners (DairyNZ, Deer Industry NZ, NZPork, 
Beef + Lamb NZ, Horticulture NZ and Foundation for Arable Research) and Crown Research 
Institutes (AgResearch, Plant and Food Research and Landcare Research) (Environment 
Canterbury, 2015c). Utilising the Overseer® model, ECAN also developed an online resource 
(Portal), to assist farmers with their nutrient budgeting and modelling and development of farm 
Figure 2.2 Nutrient risk map (From: 
Environment Canterbury, 2014b, p.2)   
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practices (Effectus Limited, 2016). The MGM, Overseer® model and Portal are discussed in 
the following two sections.  
2.1.4 Matrix of Good Management   
The MGM identifies expected nutrient losses under GMP to be used as a benchmarking tool 
(Environment Canterbury, 2016a). Using the Overseer® model, ECAN estimates nutrient 
losses under a variety of land uses and types to develop catchment loads. The project also 
provides for research to improve Overseer® model accuracy (Environment Canterbury, 2016a). 
The structure of the collaboration and partnerships created for the purposes of the MGM is 
shown below in Figure 2.3.  
 
Figure 2.3 Partnerships and collaboration under the MGM project (From: Environment 
Canterbury, 2016b)  
The MGM project outlines GMP for each industry involved in the process. The purpose is to 
provide local communities with high-quality information that helps achieve regulatory 
compliance and national expectations on water quality (Environment Canterbury, 2016a). In 
addition to benchmarking tools, the MGM project provides information to support the 
implementation of GMP. Phase Two (to be conducted 2015-2017) of the MGM project will 
incorporate the results into a regional plan and develop a database that populates the matrix 
with nitrogen and phosphorous footprint estimates (Environment Canterbury, 2013; Williams, 
et al., 2014). The aim is to eventually use the MGM project as a tool to assess compliance in 
the region (Environment Canterbury, 2013).  
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2.1.5 Overseer® and Portal 
Regional councils are using outcome based approaches in environmental regulation, 
particularly concerning nutrient leaching. This is based on the belief that input controlled 
regulations stifle innovation on farm, are less effective and inflexible (Overseer, 2015). The 
Overseer® nutrient model is a New Zealand developed electronic tool for predicting annual 
losses in a farm’s nutrient budget across a range of farming systems (Overseer, 2015). The tool 
was originally designed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries to be used for fertiliser 
recommendations (Selbie, Watkins, Wheeler & Shepherd, 2013). Overseer®, a publicly 
available software program, generates information on nutrient flows (nitrogen, phosphorous, 
potassium, sulphur, calcium, magnesium and sodium) and greenhouse gas emissions for farm 
‘blocks’, accounting for changes in management or terrain type across an entire farm system 
(Overseer, 2015). 
The model has been used to inform regulation in response to the NPS on Freshwater 
Management on nutrient load limits (Overseer, 2015). Monitoring activities such as nutrient 
budgets can be useful in measuring environmental impacts of nutrient use and the sustainability 
of nutrient flows on farm (Wheeler, et al., 2003). However, given the complex nature of farming 
systems, the model has some limits in its application (Edmeades, 2014). The use of Overseer® 
in regulation has caused some feelings of uncertainty and scepticism among farmers: there is 
active debate on some of the program updates and model output (McCrone, 2015). To build on 
the MGM and use of Overseer®, ECAN developed the online tool, Portal. Portal enables 
farmers to easily determine if they require a resource consent and to compare the nutrient losses 
from their current practices (using their Overseer® file) to modelled losses if their farm was 
operating under the GMP outlined in the MGM (Effectus Limited, 2016).  
2.2 Potential advantages, disadvantages and challenges of compliance  
The benefits of complying with environmental practices outlined in the MGM and utilising 
nutrient budgets includes an increase in farm efficiencies and a potential reduction in costs 
(Shober, Hochmuth & Wiese, 2011). Access to resources like Overseer®, Portal and MGM can 
influence management practices. Nutrient budgets can be monitored and adjusted, potentially 
resulting in decreased fertiliser use and subsequent reductions in both financial cost and 
environmental impact (Environment Southland, 2014). Operating outside regulatory limits can 
expose farmers to abatement or infringement notices and possible fines and court fees (Tasman 
District Council, 2015). Macdonald (2014), in a study of the financial costs of environmental 
compliance in the Waikato region, modelled four scenarios: decreasing stocking rate; building 
increased effluent storage and expanding application area; winter grazing; and building a 
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covered feed pad/housing shelter. The modelling in all scenarios demonstrated a reduction in 
nitrogen leaching with housing and destocking achieving the largest reductions. Investing in 
cow housing technology provided the greatest financial benefit – increasing farm surplus on 
average by 11 per cent per hectare across a range of milk prices and farm systems (low to high 
input) (Macdonald, 2014).   
However, there can be a range of costs associated with limiting nutrient losses. A survey of 
Waikato dairy farmers conducted by Macdonald (2014), showed there was a real cost in 
environmental compliance to every farm business, either through infrastructure investment or 
through a financial or opportunity cost. Most of the costs incurred in the compliance process 
stemmed from inadequate storage or effluent treatment upgrades, resulting in an aggregated 
average initial capital cost of $1.03 per kilogram of milk solids (Macdonald, 2014). The Lincoln 
University Dairy Farm, in reducing its nitrogen loss by 17 per cent, saw a reduction in farm 
productivity (Pellow, 2015). This equated to $525 NZD per hectare cost or a mitigation cost of 
$75 NZD per kilogram of nitrogen in the 2013/14 season (Pellow, 2015).   
Farmer compliance with environmental regulation in New Zealand is further complicated by 
uncertainties surrounding the relevant science; the use of an evolving modelling tool; and the 
overall regulatory environment (Purvis, Boggess, Moss & Holt, 1995; Landcare Research, 
2011). The use of Overseer® as a method for monitoring compliance by many regional councils 
has resulted in figures for nutrient losses differing from previous estimates, in some cases 
because of program updates. Margins of error also occur due to model assumptions on the 
transfer of nutrients (Edmeades, 2014). Overseer® assumes that GMP are being followed and 
if they are not, can underestimate losses (Wheeler, Ledgard & Monaghan, 2007). Additionally, 
under the NPS on Freshwater Management, regional councils set limits based on local water 
quality. If quality continues to decrease, farmers believe they may face tighter restrictions on 
their nutrient limit load. Macdonald (2014) noted a general attitude of uncertainty among 
farmers surveyed in the Waikato – 22 per cent of the comments indicated that while farmers 
had made significant investments to become compliant, council staff could not advise them 
whether the farm had met, or would continue to meet, regulation(s). Lack of understanding of 
current regulation and ongoing uncertainty over future regulation were key themes revealed in 
the qualitative results of the study (Macdonald, 2014).  
2.3 Relevant theories and conceptual foundations  
The following section provides a discussion on theories that are used in this study. According to 
Etienne (2011), no central theory exists that is consistent and comprehensive enough to fully 
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account for myriad compliance behaviour motivators. Etienne (2011) suggests that this is due in 
large part to theorists’ inability to build consistent models capturing the pursuit of multiple, 
sometimes conflicting motivations, as well as the interactions among these motivations. For the 
purposes of this study, the conceptual model is built on Reasoned Action Approach (RAA), 
discrete choice theory, and empirical findings related to the context.   
2.3.1 Defining motivations for compliance behaviour  
The seminal research on compliance is based on calculated motivations. Becker (1968) 
predicted that regulatees comply with regulation only when they conclude that the benefit of 
compliance outweighs the cost (cost of becoming compliant multiplied by the potential penalty 
of fines and other sanctions). This is modelled on a basic utility function – with the decision-
maker assuming to choose the course of action (compliance versus non-compliance) associated 
with the highest net return. The costs associated with non-compliance are based on the 
likelihood of detection and speed, certainty and size of sanctions or fines (Becker, 1968). 
Subsequent empirical work suggests that the most important component of a regulatory system 
is enforcement. 
However, much of the literature on compliance evolved to include normative and social 
motivations (Burby & Paterson, 1993; Tyler, 1990). Normative motivations develop from a 
regulatee’s moral sense of duty and agreement with the regulation (Burby & Paterson, 1993). 
This moral duty is based on two considerations: first, the regulatee’s sense of civic duty to obey 
laws. Fear of shame - a self-imposed deterrent, stems from this sense of duty (Grasmick, Bursik 
& Kinsey, 1991; Scholz & Pinney, 1995). The second consideration is more specific to the 
regulation. Regulatory rules acceptance is based on the perceived reasonableness of the rule, 
stemming from a recognition of harm from rule violations and how rules are enacted (Scholz 
& Lubell, 1998; May, 2005). Additionally, fair treatment from authorities enforcing regulations 
and the extent to which other community members comply fall under this consideration (Levi, 
1997). Absent majority compliance resulting from these motivations, a much stronger 
enforcement tool would be required (Tyler, 1990).  
Social motivations result from the desire of regulatees to be respected by those in their 
communities and networks. Social pressure can come from other regulatees, trade associations, 
external advocacy groups, the media or personal relationships (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990). 
Compliance can also be motivated through the interactions that those being regulated have with 
inspectors. Enforcement styles and relationships that form between regulators and regulatees 
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can shape social expectations. Winter and May (2001) found that the degree of formalism and 
the degree of coercion in these interactions can impact compliance.   
Social motivations are also employed in Responsive Regulation Theory (RR). RR was 
presented by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992, p. 3), as a method of regulatory design that is 
developed through the collaboration between state and self-regulation, where self-regulation by 
industry is a major part of the process. Arguably, the MGM discussed in previous sections is 
an attempt by ECAN to use and harness social pressure. The following figure is an example of 
a typical RR pyramid (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992, p. 3).   
  
Figure 2.4 RR pyramid (From: Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992, p. 35)  
At the base of the pyramid, regulators encourage compliance by appealing to an individual’s 
sense of social responsibility. It is generally accepted that most people are willing to ‘do the 
right thing’ and so form the pyramid’s foundation (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992, p. 35). Further 
up the pyramid are those willing to comply but needing reminders or assistance. Higher levels 
of the pyramid are associated with increasingly non-compliant individuals, requiring 
progressively stringent regulatory approaches (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992, p. 35). The size of 
each layer is broadly representative of the relative proportions of the population requiring each 
regulatory approach.  
RR is intended to operate within frameworks that allow regulatory bodies to create binding 
regulations with enforceable sanctions and use a hierarchy of strategies with varying degrees 
of intervention. Under RR, regulatory bodies convey to their audience less intrusive 
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interventions at the base levels of the pyramid are preferred: they will only move to higher 
levels in response to industry non-compliance (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992, p. 35). While the 
theory of RR attempts to address the plurality of motivations, it does not fully address the 
complexity of motivational behaviour. Etienne (2011) contends RR is based on two discordant 
ideas of consequences and appropriateness: choice results from a cost-benefit, but individuals 
may follow moral norms internalised in relationships built on trust.   
2.3.2 Reasoned Action Approach 
The RAA was developed from the Theory of Planned Behaviour and the Theory of Reasoned  
Action to account for each theory’s limits in understanding behaviours in which people have 
incomplete decision making control (Ajzen, 1991). Central to understanding behaviour in RAA 
is the individual’s intention to perform – a measure of how much effort a person is willing to 
exert to perform the behaviour. The stronger the intention, the more likely the behavioural 
performance (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p. 22). However, intention can only be expressed as 
behaviour if the behaviour is under volitional control. The performance of most behaviours also 
relies on opportunities and resources available to the individual (money, skill, time, etc.), such 
that if enough resources are in place, and the individual intends to perform, they should succeed 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p. 23). The joint action of motivation and ability on behavioural 
achievement has long been discussed in theory (Locke, 1965; Anderson, 1974; Sarver, 1983).   
  
Figure 2.5 Reasoned Action Approach (From: Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p. 22)  
Figure 2.5 presents the RAA model. While actual control (ability) is made clear, in the study of 
behaviour, perception of control is of greater interest. Perceived control relates an individual’s 
perception of how difficult the performance of a particular action is – behaviour intention is 
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strongly influenced by their confidence in their ability (Ajzen, 1991). For accurate 
measurement, intentions and perceptions must be assessed in relation to the behaviour of 
interest. However, the impact of these variables may vary across different situations. Only one, 
two or all three may have a significant impact on the intention to act (Ajzen, 1991). RAA 
hypothesises three factors that can lead to intention: attitude, or the degree to which an 
individual has a favourable evaluation of the behaviour; perceived norm; and behavioural 
control (Ajzen, 1991). RAA is used widely in behavioural research including the adoption of 
agricultural techniques (Renzi & Klobas, 2008). Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p. 331) suggest that 
if the impact of the variables influencing behavioural intention are known, interventions can 
also be made on the variables and thereby influence intention and behaviour. 
Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, pp. 301-303) acknowledge the critiques of and challenges to their 
theory that have arisen since it was first developed. It is suggested that the theory can only 
account for 50-60 per cent of the variance in intention and 30-40 per cent of the variance in 
behaviour, which approach the limits of predictive validity (Gold, 2011). Their theory has also 
been considered too rational and Western culture specific. There are however a number of 
published papers that use RAA to successfully predict irrational behaviours (i.e. smoking) or in 
non-Western cultures (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2010, p. 303). 
2.3.3 Discrete choice theory 
Discrete choice models are used in the study of behaviour to describe, explain or predict choices 
between two or more distinct alternatives. The set of alternatives (the choice set) is defined so 
that the alternatives are mutually exclusive and exhaustive (Jeliazkov & Rahman, 2012). In this 
study, the choice set includes compliance and non-compliance. Models are motivated by an 
underlying latent variable threshold-crossing framework, and statistically relate a choice to the 
attributes of the choice-maker and the attributes of the alternatives (Jeliazkov & Rahman, 2012). 
Generally, discrete choice models are derived from a utility maximisation framework, in which 
decision-makers are assumed to choose options that result in the highest utility or satisfaction 
possible (Jeliazkov & Rahman, 2012). While analysts cannot directly observe the decision-
maker’s utility, they can observe their ultimate choice, as well as some of the attributes of both   
the alternatives and the decision-maker. The theoretical models of choice are estimated 
empirically by specifying a probabilistic function relating the outcome of the choice to the 
observable factors (Jeliazkov & Rahman, 2012).   
It is important to note that in discrete choice models, the absolute value of a decision-maker’s 
utility is not relevant. The choice behaviour is hypothesised to be driven by differences in utility 
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rather than its absolute value (Jeliazkov & Rahman, 2012). Discrete choice theory is utilised to 
help develop an empirical model for compliance, while RAA helps inform the variables 
measured in this study. The following sections present empirical studies on agro-environmental 
compliance and farm practice adoption that help identify independent variables.  
2.4 Empirical studies on compliance and conservation practice adoption 
The previous section showcased theory on behavioural motivations for compliance and forms 
part of the understanding of the factors influencing compliance. Research discussed in this 
section suggests that farmer behaviour regarding environmental management activities can be 
influenced by the characteristics of the farm, farmer and regulation or program, attitudes, 
perceptions and norms. 
2.4.1 Traditional characteristics  
There is disparate research regarding the impact of traditional farmer and farm characteristics 
on adoption behaviour related to conservation practices. While Carlson, Dillman and Lassey 
(1981) found no relationship between biological age and conservation technology adoption,  
D’Souza, Cyphers and Phipps (1993) found younger farmers tend to adopt new conservation 
techniques first. Abd-Ella, Hoiberg and Warren (1981) found that years of farming, not age, 
was positively associated with the adoption of conservation technologies. Traore, Landry and 
Amara (1998) conversely suggest that years of farming negatively influenced adoption of 
conservation technologies, as farmers become more complacent about environmental 
degradation issues. 
There is literature reporting a positive relationship between conservation adoption and formal 
education (D’Souza et al., 1993; Kilpatrick, 2000). Kilpatrick (2000), found farmer education 
and training increased their willingness to make conservation related changes to their 
management. Additionally, Traore et al. (1998), Suwunnamek and Suwanmaneepong (2011), 
Ganpat, et al. (2014) and Zingiro, Okello and Guthiga (2014) found participation in local 
organisations and government programs and access to extension services was positively 
associated with an increase in access to information and training, leading to an increase in 
adoption. Compliance behaviour can only be understood if a capacity for regulatees to comply 
exists. Awareness of regulation and regulatory rules are key aspects of compliance (Winter &  
May, 2001). When regulations such as ECAN’s resource consents use performance objectives, 
such as an amount of nutrient leaching, the means for compliance may not be well understood.   
Having the financial capability to comply can also influence compliance (Winter & May, 2001). 
This capacity is distinct from other motivational factors, as regulatees may have intentions to 
 19  
  
comply, but cannot (actual control in RAA model). Profitability has consistently been shown 
to be a critical factor in adoption. Concerns for the environment only become motivating factors 
once basic economic and survival needs are met (Langholz, Lassoie, Lee & Chapman 2000; 
Vanclay & Lawrence, 1994; Dunlap & Van Liere, 1984). Siebert, Toogood and Knierim (2006), 
noted in their review, that studies conducted in Finland showed that farmers saw compliance 
with environmental regulations was part of ensuring their farms’ viability. Rogers (2003, pp. 
283-288) found that farmers with higher social standings such as class, income and community 
status also tend to be early adopters of innovative practices. This is supported by Smit and 
Smithers (1992) and Furman (1997) who found high income farmers respond to conservation 
practices more quickly. Additionally, Zingiro, et al. (2014) in their discrete choice logit 
regression analysis, found that income levels affected the likelihood of farmers in Rwanda 
adopting practices that mitigate drought effects.  
Atari, Yiridoe, Smale and Duinker (2009) studied the participation of Canadian farmers in Nova 
Scotia’s environmental farm plan program. Unlike some of the literature referenced above, the 
authors found traditional farmer and farm attributes (i.e. age; formal education) were not 
associated with an increased level of participation. Rather, farm income, years in the industry 
and the type of agricultural sector involved was associated with participation.  
2.4.2 Attitudes and perceptions  
Compliance motivations can be influenced by attitudes and perceptions toward regulation or 
practice context, trust, moral sense of duty and confidence, which may not be as observable as 
traditional characteristics. May (2005) showed how regulatory context influenced compliance 
and how normative and social motivations differed in their analysis of three separate regulatory 
contexts: Danish farmers and environmental regulation; United States (US) homebuilders and 
safety; and US marine facilities and water quality. May (2005) suggests that the differences 
between compliance levels in these contexts stems from willingness to comply with rules, the 
evaluation of rules and the acceptance of governmental authority, as well as regulatory design 
– specifically, inspection interactions. Danish farmers had a strong sense of duty to comply and 
low deterrent fears resulting in the highest level of compliance of the three cases, while boatyard 
operators in the US had a low sense of duty and a high deterrent of fears – highlighting differing 
motivations (May, 2005). Differences in regimes and styles within and between countries can 
shape compliance motivations (Gormley & Peters, 1992; Axelrad & Kagan, 2000).   
Research into farmer behaviour and conservation practice adoption has tested the RAA. Borges, 
Lansink, Ribeiro and Lutke (2014) found Brazilian farmers’ attitudes toward improving natural 
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grassland, perceptions of social pressure and perceptions of capabilities, were all significantly 
and positively correlated with their intention to use improved natural grassland. Lynne, Casey, 
Hodges and Rahmani (1995) also showed actual control (financial), as well as social pressure 
and perceived behavioural control, were significant influencing factors in water saving 
technology adoption among Florida strawberry farmers. A number of studies such as: Beedell 
and Rehman’s (1999) study of farmer hedge management in England; Wauters, Bielders, 
Poesen, Govers and Mathijs’ (2010) study of soil conversation practices in Belgium; and 
Menozzi, Fioravanzi and Donati’s (2014) study of Italian wheat producers’ adoption of 
sustainable practices also contributed to the validation of RAA theoretical constructs 
influencing behaviour in the farming sector.    
Perceived equity, too, may impact the uptake of conservation practices on farm. Environmental 
initiatives can create a disproportionate spread of costs and benefits, resulting in real or 
perceived inequalities for farmers (Jodha & Russel, 1997). When it is perceived that 
conservation practices are inequitable in cost and benefits sharing, communities have little 
incentive to adopt (Tisdell, 1998). However, the concept of equity can be quite subjective when 
linked to the individual farmer’s perceptions and values. Measuring equitability can be difficult 
and only comes from an understanding of the factors stakeholders use to determine equity at 
the individual level (Kabii & Horwitz, 2006). Arbuckle (2013), showed a strong correlation 
between farmer support for pro-environmental regulation and policy and those who viewed 
conservation behaviour as central to their farming identity. The higher the value placed on 
conservation in practice, the greater the support for policy. Winter and May (2001) found social 
and normative motivations were as influential in creating compliance to agro-environmental 
regulations in Denmark as calculated motivations. Additionally, they found the use of coercion 
by compliance inspectors dampened, rather than fostered, compliance while a developed 
relationship with the inspector had a positive linear relationship with compliance (Winter & 
May, 2001). 
Spatially and contextually, there are differences in the significance that independent variables 
play in conservation agriculture and innovation adoption. Knowler and Bradshaw (2007) 
reviewed 31 analyses drawn from 23 published studies and found that few, if any, variables 
were universally significant (see Appendix A). Knowler and Bradshaw (2007) note that this 
presents challenges for policy makers. Their findings support the view of Stonehouse (1996), 
who advocated that policy mechanisms must be geared to those of the locale in which they 
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operate or to individual farmers and operations. Table 2.1 provides a summary review of some 
of the studies discussed above, the method of analysis and their significant findings.  
Table 2.1 Summary of empirical findings   
Research details  Variables identified as significantly 
related to farmer compliance  
Kilpatrick (2000): Australia; univariate and 
chi squared test  
Education and training improves farm 
decision-making and farm practice change  
Winter and May (2001): Denmark; Ordinary 
Least Squares  
Awareness of rules; likelihood of detection; 
compliance costs; inspector formalism;  
attitudes; inspector coercion  
Shefer, Cohen & Bekhor (2004): Israel; 
discrete choice and logit   
Age of the settlement; farmer’s tendency to 
consult R&D personnel; farm size; 
frequency of visits to R&D centre; farm 
investment; farmer age  
Siebert, et al. (2006): European Union; meta-
analysis  
Attitude (interests, values, norms, problem 
awareness and self-perception); ability (type 
of farm business, area of farming, age, 
education etc.); social influences (direct and 
indirect interactions with socio-cultural, 
political and juridical conditions); effect of 
policy (instruments, content and results)  
Atari, et al. (2009): Canada; chi squared 
tests  
Commodity group (industry); region of 
operation; knowledge of program; years in 
industry; farm income  
Suwunnamek and Suwanmaneepong  
(2011): Thailand; logistic regression  
Livestock numbers; farm size; age; 
education; labour; membership of farmer 
organisation; government subsidy  
Arbuckle (2013): United States; logistic 
regression  
Conservation values linked to support for 
environmental policy  
Ganpat, et al. (2014): Trinidad and Tobago;  
ANOVA test with associated post-hoc test  
(Tukey’s b)   
Land tenure, number of extension officers’ 
visits and age  
  
2.5 New Zealand studies   
Literature on the factors influencing regulatory compliance related to nutrient losses on farm in 
New Zealand is limited. Most compliance related studies focused on the Waikato region, most 
likely because it is the largest dairy producing region (DairyNZ Limited, 2016). Local research 
on compliance and environmental practice adoption helps frame an understanding of the factors 
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involved in agro-environmental compliance in Canterbury, as there are few, if any, universally 
significant independent variables in conservation adoption (Knowler & Bradshaw, 2007).  
In a study of the factors influencing dairy farmer effluent compliance in the Waikato region, 
farmers relied heavily on consultants; their own and other farmers’ experiences; articles and 
suppliers to inform their decisions to upgrade their management systems to become compliant. 
They were, however, concerned about the lack of technical information and unbiased advice 
(Davies, Kaine & Lourey, 2007). Wang (2016) found that strong farmer-to-farmer relationships 
and access to information were influential determinants of the adoption of GMP in the Waikato 
region. Environmental performance on farm was positively influenced by geographical location 
and social relationships between farmers (Wang, 2016). In terms of socio-demographics, Murphy 
(2014), found that farmer and farm characteristics were weakly associated with innovation 
adoption on-farm in the Canterbury region and that compatibility and profitability of innovations 
used on their operations, in particular, was of primary importance. 
Van Reenen (2012) conducted interviews with sheep and beef farmers in the Waikato and Bay 
of Plenty regions, finding that the greatest barrier to adopting environmentally sustainable 
practices was cost. Other barriers noted included knowledge gaps; attitudes to environmental 
issues; fear of regulatory rules; maintenance requirements; and lack of understanding of the 
benefits of environmental GMP (Van Reenen, 2012). Van Reenen (2012) reported that the 
motivations for undertaking environmental practices the farms currently had were generally 
related to management benefits, like animal health and pasture management.   
2.6 Literature gap 
Despite a wealth of research internationally regarding the factors critical to the adoption of 
conservation practices and motivations for regulatory compliance on farm, there is little 
empirical evidence on the factors influencing agro-environmental regulatory compliance on-
farm in New Zealand. The literature lays out a multiplicity of variables that may impact 
compliance, but there is little information about which factors are critical. Further, there are no 
clear, universally significant, factors that affect adoption behaviour or motivations for 
regulatory compliance on farm. Given the lack of generalisation in adoption and compliance 
studies due to their spatial and contextual differences, there is minimal understanding of the 
factors leading to compliance with environmental regulations like effluent discharge consents 
among dairy farmers in Canterbury. Chapter 3 will present research objectives and aims to 
address this lacuna in the literature.  
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Chapter 3 
Research objectives and aims 
3.1 Study objectives  
Given the findings and literature gap presented in Chapter 2, this research seeks to improve our 
understanding of effluent consent compliance on dairy farms in Canterbury. The specific 
objectives of this study are to:  
1. Identify the factors influencing full ECAN dairy effluent discharge consent compliance  
2. Determine the impact of the identified factors on full ECAN effluent consent compliance  
3. Make recommendations to inform policy and industry stakeholders  
3.2 Research questions  
There is an array of factors that may influence consent holders’ compliance decisions. These 
may be observable at varying levels in both compliant and non-compliant operations such as 
years farming, educational background and membership in producer organisations or attitudes 
and perceptions. Existing literature suggests control, or the capacity (chiefly financial and 
knowledge) to follow through with behavioural intentions, is key in conservation practice 
adoption and ability to comply with regulation.  
The corresponding research questions are:  
1. What are the factors influencing dairy effluent discharge consent compliance in the study area?  
2. What are the critical factors influencing dairy effluent discharge consent compliance?  
  
The following chapter presents the research methodology and design used to achieve the study 
objectives and answer the research questions.      
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Chapter 4 
Methodology and research design 
This chapter describes the research methodology and design, data collection and analysis. 
Section 4.1 presents the research strategy and the conceptual model. Section 4.2 details the data 
collection method. Section 4.3 presents the data analysis methods.  
4.1 Research approach 
The objectives of this study were to determine and assess the significance of factors that impact 
ECAN effluent consent compliance in the dairy industry. RAA provides a useful framework to 
guide the choice of variables that can be linked to the practical policy interventions that may 
ultimately influence compliance behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp. 20-22). The study 
utilised a largely quantitative approach with additional text analysis and dialog with policy 
makers for a richer understanding of complex behaviour. The research generated numerical and 
categorical data that could be meaningfully aggregated and summarised, and ultimately 
statistically analysed (Punch, 2005, p. 55).   
A non-experimental survey approach was deemed an appropriate method to collect the primary 
data as it permits replicability and a degree of cross-case comparability (Tornatzky & Klein, 
1982). The primary data required to address the research questions presented in Chapter 3 was 
generated from a survey in the form of an electronic questionnaire conducted with Canterbury 
dairy effluent discharge consent holders. To facilitate a greater understanding of attitudes of 
consent holders towards ECAN regulation and inspection processes, qualitative data was also 
collected using this questionnaire through respondents’ comments on their experiences with 
regulation and inspections. This data was analysed using text analysis.  
4.1.1 Theoretical framework for this research   
Based on the literature and developed from discrete choice theory of utility maximisation and 
RAA, a conceptual model was specified for this study to examine the factors that influence 
ECAN effluent consent compliance through economic, sociological and psychological 
motivations (Figure 4.1).   
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Figure 4.1 ECAN resource consent compliance model (adapted from Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p. 
22)  
The solid lines indicate a direct influence with arrows showing the direction of the relationship. 
Appendix B presents the variables, proxies, constructs and items used to measure these 
relationships and what their expected impact was based on the literature review. Farm and 
consent holder characteristics refer to socio-demographics and operational characteristics that 
can reflect individual behaviours (toward compliance) (Welch & Marc-Aurele, 2001). Attitudes 
and perceptions relate to factors such as values, interests, and problem awareness – dispositions 
associated with behaviour (Siebert, et al., 2006). For the purpose of this study, attitudes were 
categorised by perceptions toward the environment, the equitability of current regulation and 
environmental management costs and attitudes on current ECAN regulation. Included in this 
section was problem awareness and internal attribution. Subjective norms represented 
perceived social pressure – descriptive and injunctive, with regard to regulation. Perceived 
behavioural control referred to the perceived ease or difficulty in performing the behaviour and 
reflected past experiences and control over anticipated obstacles. Perceived financial control 
related to the perceived impact of farm financial situations and milk payout levels on 
compliance levels.  
4.2 Data collection method  
Data was collected with an electronic survey delivered to participants by email. Surveys 
generate information about the same variables from a number of cases to provide a structured 
data matrix (de Vaus, 1995, p. 3). Online surveys tend to have the lowest response rate of all 
Perceived  
behavioural  
control   
Farm and consent  
holder  
characteristics  
Subjective norms   
Perceived  
financial control   
ECAN effluent  
consent  
compliance    
Attitudes  and  
perceptions  
 26  
  
survey methods, largely due to internet connections/access, deliverability, computer literacy 
and online survey fatigue (Pecoraro, 2012). Typical response rates are approximately 5 – 10 
per cent, which can lead to non-response bias (Semler, 2010). Consequently, this study used 
techniques from the literature to increase the response rate (Sauermann & Roach, 2013). For 
example: sending the survey on a weekday; using multiple reminders while still considering 
the marginal increase in response rate; ensuring reminders were sent on the same days/times 
(heterogeneous samples); offering a prize incentive; and changing the wording of each contact 
to maintain attention were all used to help achieve the highest possible response rate 
(Sauermann & Roach, 2013). Email surveys offer significant cost and time efficiencies over 
postal surveys in survey design, implementation and processing (Nulty, 2008).  
4.2.1 Questionnaire background  
The online questionnaire was developed to determine:   
(a) the socio-demographics of effluent consent holders and their operational characteristics;  
(b) their attitudes towards and perceptions of the physical environment, equitability of 
current regulation and the regulation and regulatory processes in place, their problem 
awareness and attribution;  
(c) subjective norms (injunctive and descriptive);   
(d) perceived behavioural control; and  
(e) perceived financial control 
 The choice of the constructs and questions were derived from literature presented in Chapter 2 
and RAA. Fisbein and Ajzen (2010, pp. 449-456) provide survey guidelines for testing 
behaviour. The survey utilised dichotomous and categorical questions as well as Likert scales 
(bipolar) – the most highly recommended techniques in the application of RAA (Ajzen, 1991).   
Qualtrics, a secure online survey software application available through Lincoln University, 
was employed in the design and distribution of the online questionnaire. Qualtrics delivers 
rigorous privacy standards and account password protection with real-time data replication 
(Qualtrics LLC, 2016).   
The questionnaire contained three main sections. The first collected quantitative and categorical 
data on demographic and operational characteristics including gender, ethnicity, age, dairy 
farming experience, highest level of education, training and workshop attendance, farm size, 
number of livestock being milked, ownership structure, if there were other decision-making 
parties on farm, catchment, use of consultants and years out of five with a positive dairy 
operating profit.   
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Section Two consisted largely of ordinal Likert scale questions related to problem awareness, 
attribution, perceptions of and attitudes towards the physical environment, the equitability of 
current regulation and responsibility for environmental management, the current regulation and 
regulatory processes, experiences with inspections and the regulatory process injunctive and 
descriptive norms, and perceived behavioural and financial control. This section also included 
a qualitative question regarding the ratings for inspections and the regulatory process.   
The third section posed questions related to respondents’ level of compliance at their last 
inspection and if non-compliant, the degree to which they were non-compliant (minor or 
significant), the reasons for their non-compliance and associated issue(s) that occurred to cause 
non-compliance (weather, management issue, infrastructure, etc.).  A full copy of the survey is 
set out in Appendix C. 
4.2.1.1 Ethics approval  
Lincoln University has rigorous human ethics requirements in place to ensure the interests of 
participants, researchers and the University are protected. Any research involving human 
participants as sources of information must be reviewed by the Lincoln University Human 
Ethics Committee, a nationally accredited ethics committee (Lincoln University, 2014). Given 
the nature of this research, the questionnaire and an application were submitted for review and 
approval by the Committee. Approval was granted June 20, 2016 (Application No. 2016-31, 
Appendix D). 
4.2.2 Sample selection and distribution  
The objective of this research was to determine how effluent consent holder and operational 
characteristics, attitudes and perceptions, subjective norms and perceived control influence 
compliance with effluent consents. The survey was conducted with the assistance of ECAN and 
sent to all consent holders for whom ECAN held viable addresses.   
The final email contact list was derived from 868 consents out of a population of 1213 current 
effluent consents. This resulted in 542 email addresses (as some individuals hold multiple 
consents). Of these addresses, 513 were active (email was deliverable). The emails were sent 
from an ECAN customer service email address to ensure privacy protection conditions between 
the consent holder and ECAN were maintained. The survey instrument was distributed during 
a general slow period on farm (prior to calving) in an effort increase response rates. The initial 
contact was emailed on June 23, 2016, mid-morning. Three reminder emails were sent at two 
week intervals on July 8, July 21 and August 5, 2016, during the mid-morning period. These 
reminder emails each contained different wording from the initial email, as research suggests 
 28  
  
multiple contacts with varied wording can assist in achieving higher response rates (Sauermann 
& Roach, 2013). A total of 72 surveys were returned by August 18, 2016 survey close date 
representing a response rate of 14 per cent.    
4.3 Data analysis  
The data analysis was conducted using the statistical software package for social sciences 
(SPSS 23). Behavioural theorists generally use correlations and/or multiple regressions to 
validate the measures of various indicators or drivers of behaviour or behavioural intention 
(Hankins, French & Horne, 2000). Section 4.3 discusses the survey variables and analysis 
methods used.  
4.3.1 Survey data and variables included  
The electronic questionnaire consisted primarily of questions that produced categorical or 
ordinal data. The questionnaire contained 62 questions (generating 148 variables) covering a 
range of topics, with an additional 12 questions that collected both categorical data and 
qualitative data in the form of written comments (i.e. ‘other’ category selected). Sixty-one 
questions were categorical – being dichotomous (only two categories which may be ordered), 
ordinal (categories ranked in a meaningful way) or nominal (no implied order or rank) (Morgan 
et al., 2007, pp. 39-40). The one remaining question asked for respondents’ views, providing 
qualitative data. 
The dichotomous variables included gender of consent holder and whether there were other 
decision-making parties on farm. Additional nominal variables included farm ownership 
structure, ethnicity, catchment location, which societal group is responsible for environmental 
management and the best method of intervention. The remainder of the categorical variables in 
this analysis follow a logical order and are treated as ordinal (Morgan, Leech, Gloeckner & 
Barrett, 2007, p. 41). The distinctions among the variables as dichotomous, nominal or ordinal 
are important when selecting and evaluating statistics (Morgan et al., 2007, p. 41).   
4.3.2 Statistics used in the analysis  
4.3.2.1 Descriptive statistics and exploratory analysis  
The univariate analysis in this study was used to develop a better understanding of the 
demographics of Canterbury dairy effluent discharge consent holders along with the 
characteristics of their farm and their attitudes and perceptions around environmental 
regulation. Exploratory data analysis generally involves the use of descriptive statistics to 
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describe a single variable through units of analysis like the mean, median, standard deviation 
and range (Babbie, 2010, p. 426).   
4.3.2.2 Bivariate analysis  
The first and second objective of this research were to determine the factors influencing the 
attainment of full compliance with ECAN effluent consents and which factors were strongly 
related to compliance. To achieve these objectives, both bivariate and multivariate analyses 
were used. 
A bivariate analysis can be used to investigate the relationship between two variables. Such 
analyses can take the form of simple cross tabulation tables to explore the data, or the 
calculation of statistics such as correlation coefficients to provide a numerical measure of linear 
association for continuous data (Babbie, 2010, p. 437).  Non-parametric statistics and tests can 
be used to analyse categorical data, or continuous data that is not normally distributed (Field, 
2009, p. 691). To determine the direction, strength (effect size) and significance of the 
relationships between the variables, chi-square, Mann-Whitney U and/or Kendall’s tau statistics 
were calculated – providing accepted measures of non-parametric relationships or correlations 
(Field, 2009, p. 181). Tau-b (τb) was used to determine direction for square tables while tau-c 
(τc) was used for rectangular tables, with values ranging from −1 (perfect negative association) 
to +1 (perfect positive association). A zero value indicates no association (Morgan et al., 2007, 
p. 112).   
Significance tests determine the likelihood that a relationship between two or more variables is 
due to a chance occurrence. Low p-values typically less than 0.05 imply that we reject the null 
hypothesis of no association. Conversely, high p-values (typically p>.05) supports the opposite 
conclusion: chance is likely to have caused the pattern (Sweet & Grace-Martin, 2008, pp. 9699). 
If the p value is small, the finding is statistically significant, however, this does not necessarily 
translate to a strong or important relationship or reflect causality (Sweet & GraceMartin, 2008, 
p. 96). Morgan et al., (2007, pp. 94-95), note that the p-value must be interpreted with caution, 
as the choice in correlation coefficient could create differences and measures are not necessarily 
direct indices of the importance of the finding. 
Given the question categories’ size and the valid response rate, some variables combined similar 
categories within individual variables to provide support for the analysis and increase the 
possibility of discovering significant (p<0.1) relationships. These new variables have fewer 
categories with more responses in each category and were guided either by the frequency 
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distribution of data or by the similarities in categories (i.e. ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ versus 
‘neutral’ to ‘strongly disagree’). This allowed for greater comparison of groups as, for example, 
large farms versus small farms and provided more manageable presentation of the data. Details 
of transformations can be found in Appendix E. The bivariate tests described above are used to 
determine relationships between compliance behaviour and various control variables. 
Amalgamating categories reduces the degrees of freedom and increased the ability to discover 
significant relationships. A number of significant relationships were found using secondary 
analysis, and are presented in Chapter 5. 
4.3.2.3 Multivariate analysis: Logistic regression  
One of the most commonly used statistical techniques in behavioural sciences is regression 
analysis (Hankins, et al., 1999). Regression models are appropriate for evaluating constructs 
and the relationship between constructs (Alavifar, Karimimalayer & Anuar, 2012). With 
regression models, the influence of several explanatory on the dependent variable can be 
determined (Hankins, et al., 1999). Utilising SPSS software commonly used in behavioural 
research, regression analysis methods can estimate the link between latent and observed 
variables (Hankins, et al., 1999). However, regression models assume multivariate normality, 
that may overestimate the extent to which a model fits the data (unless the sample size is very 
large) (Hu, Bentler & Kano, 1992).  
Numerous studies on farmer behaviour use ordinary least squares (OLS) or bivariate dependent 
variable regressions (logit or probit), as regression analyses can offer insight into relationships 
between variables (Knowler & Bradshaw, 2007). In this study, consent holder and farm 
characteristics, attitudes, subjective norms and perceived control are the explanatory variables 
and the dependent variable is binary: compliance or non-compliance with effluent consents. 
The explanatory variables can be continuous or categorical and are used to predict the 
likelihood of occurrence of one of the categories of a dependent variable (Sweet & Grace-
Martin, 2008, p. 175). To evaluate the conceptual model, Cronbach’s α is used to test reliability 
– that multiple variables are adequately measuring the same major construct (Field, 2009, p. 
674). The value of Cronbach’s α ranges from zero to 1, with 1 indicating complete reliability 
(α<0.5 is generally considered unacceptable) (Field, 2009, p. 675).   
Initially, the likelihood of one of the categories occurring in the dependent variable (compliance 
or non-compliance) is measured without including explanatory variables. This base model 
provides a reference to evaluate the ‘fit’ of the model with explanatory variables – shown by 
the -2 log likelihood statistic and associated chi-square statistic (Field, 2009, p. 290). A logistic 
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regression generates statistics that are used to determine the fit of the models to the data, as well 
as coefficients for the explanatory variables. For each explanatory variable, a regression 
coefficient (B) is generated, measuring the direction and strength of the relationship between 
the explanatory variables and binary dependent variable (Sweet & Grace-Martin, 2012, p. 193). 
Associated Wald statistics are calculated – if the explanatory variable is significantly different 
from zero in this statistic, it is assumed to be making a significant contribution to the prediction 
of the outcome (Field, 2009, p. 287).  
The strength of the relationship may be difficult to evaluate with raw coefficients as they are 
measured using a log scale. However, the coefficients can be transformed exponentially 
(Exp(B)) to indicate the change in odds resulting from a unit change in the explanatory variable 
(Sweet & Grace-Martin, 2012, p. 193; Field, 2009, p. 287). A value greater than one (>1) 
indicates that as the explanatory variable increases, the odds of the event in the dependent 
variable increase, while if the value is less than one (<1) this indicates that as it increases, the 
odds of the outcome decrease (Field, 2009, p. 271). Marginal effects can also be calculated, 
which provide a more direct measure of the change in the predicted probability of compliance, 
in this case, for a unit change in the explanatory variable (Williams, 2016).  Standard errors are 
also reported - a measure of dispersion which may vary due to sample size or underlying data 
distribution (Field, 2009, p. 43). 
4.4 Summary  
Based on theory and insights from the empirical literature, a quantitative research approach was 
used to guide the research design. Data collection, consisting of a survey in questionnaire 
format was distributed to consent holders by email. The survey sample consisted of those 
identified as dairy effluent discharge consent holders from ECAN’s records. The analysis of 
the survey data was conducted using SPSS 23 software. Exploratory data analysis initially 
helped describe consent holder and farm characteristics, attitudes and perceptions and 
compliance. Bivariate and logistic regression analysis were then applied to evaluate constructs 
and their relationship with compliance. Results from the analysis are reported in Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 5 
Results 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the analysis of the survey data. It is directed by research question one: 
What are the factors influencing dairy effluent discharge consent compliance in the study area; 
and research question two: What are the critical factors influencing dairy effluent discharge 
consent compliance?   
Section 5.2 describes the sample population of dairy effluent discharge consent holders in terms 
of the major constructs presented in the conceptual model. Level of compliance at last 
inspection is presented in Section 5.3. This is followed by an exploration of the results from the 
bivariate analysis – relationships between the major constructs and compliance level. Section 
5.4 presents a text analysis of the open ended question proposed to respondents about their 
ratings of inspections and the regulatory process. Section 5.5 presents a regression analysis of 
the relationships between the major constructs and compliance level. Section 5.6 summarises 
of the results.  
5.2 Univariate analysis 
5.2.1 Consent holder characteristics  
5.2.1.1 Gender, age and ethnicity  
Of the 72 responses to the questionnaire, 63 reported their gender. Eighty-one per cent of those 
identified as male. Ninety-six per cent of respondents reported their ethnicity as European New 
Zealander, with the balance consisting of European and American ethnicity. The majority of 
consent holders fell within the 46-55 and 56-65 year old age categories (Table 5.1).   
Table 5.1 Age of consent holder  
Position n = 67  Per cent  
26-35 years old  6  
36-45 years old  16.5  
46-55 years old  31  
56-65 years old  31  
66-75 years old  13.5  
76+ years old  2  
Total  100  
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Table 5.4 Farm size (hectares) 
Position n = 68 Per cent 
<100 6 
100-250 38 
250-500 42.5 
500-750 7.5 
750-1000 4.5 
1000+ 1.5 
Total 100 
  Hectares  
Mean  207 (Value=2.71)  
Median  250-500 (Value=3)  
5.2.2.2 Ownership structure and decision-making parties  
The most common form of farm ownership is the corporation/company structure (Table 5.5). 
Just under 80 per cent of respondents reported having at least one other decision-maker for the 
operation (Table 5.6). This group includes a wide range from family members to sharemilkers 
to farm managers to advisors (Figure 5.3). The most common decision-making partners were 
immediate family members.  
Table 5.5 Ownership structure  
Position n = 66  Per cent  
Sole proprietorship  14  
Partnership  14  
Corporation/Company  50.5  
Trust  17  
Maori Trust  1.5  
Limited partnership  1.5  
Mix (Limited Liability Company and Trust)  1.5  
Total  100  
  
Table 5.6 Decision-making parties on farm  
Position n = 71 Per cent 
Multiple other decision-making parties 28 
One other decision-making party 51 
No other decision-making parties 21 
Total 100 
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Figure 5.3 Decision-making parties   
5.2.2.3 Catchment location  
The majority of farms are primarily in the Ashburton zone, followed by the Selwyn-Waihora zone 
(Table 5.7). This is representative of ECAN statistics for the largest dairy catchments for the 
2014-2015 season, showing 34 per cent and 19 per cent of herds in the Ashburton and Selwyn-
Waihora zones respectively (Environment Canterbury, 2015). 
 
Table 5.7 Primary catchment of operation   
Position n = 70  Per cent  
Huruni-Waiau  10  
Waimakariri  10  
Selwyn-Waihora  18.5  
Ashburton  38.5  
Orari-Opihi-Pareora  13  
Lower Waitaki  7  
Upper Waitaki  1.5  
Kaikoura  1.5  
Total  100  
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5.2.2.4 Dairy operating profit  
The most common and average number of years respondents have had positive dairy operating 
profit outcomes is three in the past five years (Table 5.8).   
Table 5.8 Years of positive dairy operating profit  
Position n = 69 Per cent 
None 1.5 
1 7 
2 17.5 
3 36 
4 16 
5 22 
Total 100 
Mean 3.23 years 
Median  3 years 
Standard deviation 1.262 
Interquartile range 2 
 
5.2.3 Attitudes and perceptions  
5.2.3.1 Problem awareness  
Respondents were presented with four statements related to their awareness of current water 
quality issues and their consequences. Respondents were asked to rate their agreement with the 
statements on a 5-point Likert scale. The first question, “dairy farming impacts surface and 
ground water quality” saw 50 per cent of respondents either strongly agree or agree; 
approximately 32 per cent were neutral; and 18 per cent either disagreed or strongly disagreed. 
The respondents were presented with three statements regarding the effects of water quality on 
human, livestock and crop/pasture health. The majority of respondents agreed water quality 
does impact human health and livestock health at 84 per cent and 75 per cent respectively 
agreeing or strongly agreeing, while 49 per cent agreed or strongly agreed that water quality 
impacts crop and/or pasture health (Figure 5.4).  
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Figure 5.4 Problem awareness responses  
 
5.2.3.2 Attribution  
Two statements (as well as the first statement discussed in section 5.2.3.1) were posed to 
respondents on whether they believed their farming practices and industry contributed to the 
need for environmental regulation and if regulation on farm was a necessary action to improve 
local water quality. While the majority of respondents (65 per cent) either strongly agreed or 
agreed that environmental regulation on farm was necessary, only 16 per cent agreed that their 
farming practices contributed to the need for environmental regulation on farm (Table 5.9).   
Table 5.9 Attribution responses  
  Per cent: Regulation 
necessary to improve water 
quality  
Position n = 68  
Per cent: My farming 
practices did not contribute 
to the need for 
environmental regulation 
Position n = 68  
Strongly agree  9  16  
Agree 56 35 
Neutral 25 33 
Disagree 6 16 
Strongly disagree 4 0 
Total 100 100 
 
5.2.3.3 Environmental perceptions  
Respondents were asked to rate their level of concern about practices impacting the natural 
environment due to the potential consequences for native birds, plants, animals and fish on a 
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5point Likert scale. Respondents were also asked how threatening degraded soil health, weeds, 
poor water quality, water quantity and adverse weather conditions were to the physical 
environment. Taken as an average of their rating, these statements related to feelings of 
biospheric concern and environmental risks respectively. Approximately 65 per cent of 
respondents rated practices impacting the natural environment on the concerning side of neutral 
to very concerning (Table 5.10). Just under 75 per cent felt that environmental risks were on 
the threatening side of neutral to very threatening (Table 5.11).   
Table 5.10 Biospheric concern  
Position n = 67  Per cent  
Not very concerning   1.5  
Not concerning  12  
Neutral  21  
Neutral-concerning  9  
Concerning  49  
Concerning-very concerning  4.5  
Very concerning  3  
Total  100 
 
Table 5.11 Environmental risks 
Position n = 67 Per cent 
Not very threatening  1.5 
Not threatening 3 
Not threatening – neutral 3 
Neutral 18 
Neutral – threatening 18 
Threatening 40 
Threatening – very threatening 10.5 
Very threatening 6 
Total 100 
 
5.2.3.4 Equity perceptions  
Four statements and one question were posed to respondents regarding the equitability of 
current regulation on-farm in Canterbury. The statements asked respondents to rate their 
agreement on a 5-point Likert scale whether: “Canterbury farmers are unfairly impacted by 
environmental regulation”; “Nitrate limits are fairly applied to all farmers”; “Environmental 
regulation in Canterbury has a fair and equitable impact on all farmers”; and “The cost of 
environmental protection is equitable across society in Canterbury.” The question asked 
respondents, “What group in society should have primary responsibility for looking after the 
environment in a sustainable manner?”   
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The majority of respondents felt that Canterbury farmers are unfairly impacted by 
environmental regulation (53 per cent) and nitrate limits are not applied fairly to all farmers (58 
per cent) (Table 5.12). This is further confirmed with 63.5 per cent of respondents disagreeing, 
to varying degree, that environmental regulation is fair to all farmers (Table 5.13). Moreover, 
73.5 per cent of respondents felt the costs associated with environmental protection are not 
equitably distributed across society (Table 5.13). The majority of respondents felt that 
‘everyone’ in society is responsible for ensuring that the environment is managed in a 
sustainable manner (Figure 5.5).  
Table 5.12 Fair application of regulation responses 
 Per cent: Canterbury farmers 
are unfairly impacted by 
environmental regulation 
Position n = 68 
Per cent: Nitrate limits 
are fairly applied to all 
farmers  
Position n = 67 
Strongly agree  16  1.5 
Agree 37 18 
Neutral 26.5 22.5 
Disagree 20.5 43 
Strongly disagree 0 15 
Total 100 100 
 
Table 5.13 Equitability and cost spread responses 
 Per cent: Environmental 
regulation in Canterbury has 
a fair and equitable impact on 
all farmers Position n = 68 
Per cent: The cost of 
environmental protection 
is equitable across society 
in Canterbury  
Position n = 68 
Strongly agree  1.5 1.5 
Agree 17.5 9 
Neutral 17.5 16 
Disagree 48.5 50 
Strongly disagree 15 23.5 
Total 100 100 
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When asked if achieving and maintaining environmental compliance is resource exhausting in 
terms of time and money spent, over 80 per cent of respondents agreed compliance required a 
lot of their time and over 85 per cent felt it required a lot of financial resources (Figure 5.7).  
 
Figure 5.7 Compliance costs response  
Almost 70 per cent felt yearly inspections performed by Environment Canterbury staff were 
frequent enough to deter the majority of farmers from violating their consents. Over 75 per cent 
intended to be compliant with their consent conditions due to the potential for a penalty, should 
they be caught operating outside of their consent conditions (Figure 5.8).  
 
Figure 5.8 Impact of penalty scheme for non-compliance  
Despite strong agreement that yearly inspections are frequent enough to largely deter 
noncompliance, only 40 per cent of respondents felt it was easy for ECAN to detect 
noncompliance, while almost 40 per cent felt it was neither easy nor difficult. However, if a 
  
% 0 % 10 % 20 % 30 40 % 50 % 60 % 
Achieving and maintaining compliance 
requires a lot of my time 
Achieving and maintaining compliance 
requires a lot of money 
Per cent 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
  
% 0 % 20 % 40 % 60 80 % 100 % 
Inspections by Environment Canterbury are 
frequent enough to deter most farmers from 
violating their resource consents 
I intend to comply with my resource consent 
conditions because of the potential penalty 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
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farmer were detected not complying with their consent, over 60 per cent of respondents felt that 
they would be penalised for it (Figure 5.9).    
 
Figure 5.9 Non-compliance detection and penalties response  
Respondents were asked to rate their interactions with ECAN inspections and the regulatory 
process to date. The responses were largely on the positive end of the scale, with 70 per cent of 
respondents rating their experiences with inspections as good to excellent, and over 80 per cent 
rating the regulatory process as average or better (Table 5.14).  
Table 5.14 Rating of interactions with ECAN 
 Per cent: Rate your 
experience with ECAN 
inspections  
Position n = 67 
Per cent: Rate your experience 
with ECAN regulatory process 
Position n = 67 
Excellent 16.5 6 
Good 53.5 35.75 
Average 19.5 10.5 
Poor 7.5 10.5 
Terrible 3 6 
Total 100 100 
   
Mean Good (Value = 2.27) Average (Value = 2.75) 
Median Good (Value = 2) Average (Value = 3) 
Standard deviation 0.931 0.943 
Interquartile range 1 1 
 
The majority of respondents – over 70 per cent – agreed to varying degrees that they felt 
uncertain about future regulatory restrictions farmers may face (Figure 5.10). Sixty-eight per 
cent of respondents felt some mix of voluntary and market driven initiatives with government 
  
% 0 % 20 % 40 60 % 80 % 100 % 
How easy do you believe it is for ECAN to 
detect non-compliance? 
If detected being non-compliant, how likely is it 
that a farmer would be penalised? 
Extremely easy/likely Somewhat easy/ likely 
Neither easy nor difficult/ likely Somewhat difficult/ likely 
Extremely difficult/ likely 
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Respondents also experienced pressure from the farming community to comply with their 
consent conditions. Eighty-five per cent of respondents agreed other farmers would disapprove 
of them if they were not complying with their consents, and almost 60 per cent reported they 
felt pressure from the farming community at large to be compliant with their consents (Table 
5.15). Additionally, over 80 per cent agreed they felt their family and friends (people important 
to them) would disapprove if they were not compliant – only three per cent disagreed.   
Table 5.15 Community pressure  
  Per cent: Other farmers 
would disapprove if I was 
not compliant with my 
effluent consent  
Position n = 66  
Per cent: I feel pressure 
from the farming 
community to comply with 
environmental regulations 
Position n = 67  
Strongly agree  27.5  21  
Agree 57.5 38.75 
Neutral 10.5 32.75 
Disagree 4.5 7.5 
Strongly disagree 0 0 
Total 100 100 
 
5.2.4.2 Descriptive social norms  
Over 95 per cent of respondents agreed that the majority of New Zealand farmers are usually 
compliant with their effluent consents, and among the farmers they know, over 90 per cent 
agreed they are compliant most of the time (Table 5.16). However, 40 per cent agreed that 
occasional non-compliance with effluent consents was common – 31.5 per cent disagreed and  
28.5 per cent were neutral.   
Table 5.16 Perceptions of other farmers’ compliance behaviour  
  Per cent: The majority of 
farmers in New Zealand usually 
comply with their effluent 
consents  
Position n = 67  
Per cent: Among the farmers  
I know, most are compliant 
most of time  
Position n = 67  
Strongly agree  36  46.25  
Agree 59.5 46.25 
Neutral 4.5 6 
Disagree 0 0 
Strongly disagree 0 1.5 
Total 100 100 
 46  
  
5.2.5 Perceived behavioural control   
Despite a strong percentage of respondents feeling uncertainty about future regulatory 
restrictions, all respondents felt confident they would be compliant at the time of their next 
inspection and all intended to be, with the majority in strong agreement with both statements 
(Table 5.17). When asked if in the past five seasons (or seasons since consent application 
approval) they had been compliant with their effluent consents, 54.5 per cent strongly agreed; 29 
per cent agreed; six per cent were neutral; and 10.5 per cent disagreed.   
Table 5.17 Expectations of compliance level at next inspection  
  Per cent: I am confident that I 
will be compliant with my 
effluent discharge consent at 
my next inspection  
Position n = 66  
Per cent: I intend to be 
compliant at the time of 
my inspection  
Position n = 66  
Strongly agree  69.5  76  
Agree 30.5 24 
Neutral 0 0 
Disagree 0 0 
Strongly disagree 0 0 
Total 100 100 
When asked if respondents felt the fate of their farm was determined by factors outside their 
control - an indication of their belief in their internal locus of control - just over 40 per cent 
disagreed, while more than 30 per cent felt neutral on whether they could influence events and 
outcomes that would affect the fate of their farm (Figure 5.12).  
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determine the existence of an empirical relationship – in this case, a bivariate analysis is 
performed between the level of self-reported compliance and the survey items. Sections 5.3.3 
to 5.3.7 utilise cross tabulated to present the results of the relationships between compliance 
and consent holder and farm characteristics; attitudes and perceptions; subjective norms; 
perceived behavioural control; and perceived financial control respectively. Cross tabulation 
was used to further explore significant relationships (see Appendix F). Secondary bivariate 
analysis used new categorical variables to further the identification of significant relationships, 
detailed in Appendix E.      
5.3.2 Compliance levels  
Respondents were asked to self-report their level of compliance (compliant, minor 
noncompliance or significant non-compliance) at the time of their last inspection and if 
applicable, the reasoning for their non-compliance and what type of management or other issue 
occurred to cause non-compliance. Of those who responded, 89.5 per cent reported as fully 
compliant and 10.5 per cent reported minor non-compliance at their last inspection (Table 5.19). 
The types of non-compliance varied across the sample as did the issues that caused non-
compliance (Table 5.20).   
Table 5.19 Compliance level at last inspection 
Position n = 67 Per cent 
Compliant 89.5 
Minor non-compliance 10.5 
Significant non-compliance 0 
Total 100 
 
Table 5.20 Type of non-compliance and reasoning 
Position n = 7 Count Associated reasoning 
Ponding of effluent 1 Weather 
Administrative 2 Management oversight 
Exceeding the number of milking cows 1 Management oversight 
Discharge of effluent outside buffer zone 1 Financial constraints 
Blocked overflow pipe 1 - 
Exceeding application rate 1 Limited infrastructure 
 
5.3.3 Consent holder and farmer characteristics  
5.3.3.1 Consent holder characteristics  
Consent holder characteristics examined in this study include gender; age; highest level of 
formal education; years of experience in the New Zealand dairy industry; use of a farm 
consultant; and farm training or workshop and farm group meeting attendance.     
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Table 5.21 Relationship between compliance and consent holder characteristics  
  Compliance 
Gender (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
63  
0.055  
0.814  
Age (6)  n  
U  
Sig.  
67  
167.5  
0.366  
Education (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
65  
1.119  
0.290  
Experience (7)  n  
U                             
Sig.  
66  
187.5  
0.680  
Consultant use (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
66  
0.384  
0.535  
Training (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
67  
4.086  
0.043*  
a Parenthesis denotes number of categories  
*(p<0.05)  
  
There is no evidence suggesting a statistical relationship between compliance level and 
consent holder age, gender, education, years of experience or the use of a farm consultant 
(Table 5.21). However, there is evidence to support a positive relationship between non-
compliance and farm group meetings, workshops or training attendance under a secondary 
analysis between infrequent (less than once a year) and frequent (once a year or more) 
attendance (x2 = 4.086, df = 1, p<0.05; Ʈb = 0.247, p <0.05).   
5.3.3.2 Farm characteristics 
Farm characteristics include the number of livestock being milked on farm; effective farm 
size in hectares; farm ownership structure; primary catchment location; whether there are 
other parties that make decisions on-farm; and the number of years of positive dairy 
operating profit in the last five years. 
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Table 5.22 Relationship between compliance and farm characteristics 
    Compliance  
Livestock milked (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
67  
6.453  
0.011*  
 Farm size (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
65  
5.535  
0.019*  
Ownership (6)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
67  
1.119  
0.290  
Decision-making parties (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
67  
0.026  
0.872  
Catchment (7)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
67  
9.641  
0.210  
Profit (6)  n  
U  
Sig.  
66  
144.5  
0.166  
a Parenthesis denotes number of categories 
*(p<0.05)  
There is no evidence suggesting a relationship between compliance levels and ownership 
structure, decision-making parties on farm, catchment location or profit (Table 5.22). 
However, there is evidence to support a positive relationship between non-compliance and 
the number of livestock milked when a secondary analysis is performed at less than 1000 
and more than 1000 cows milked (x2 = 6.453, df = 1, p<0.02; Ʈb = 0.295, p<0.02). There is 
also evidence of a relationship when categories are not re-coded (U = 116.5, N1 = 610, N2 
= 7, p<0.05). There is evidence of a positive relationship between non-compliance and farm 
size in hectares at a secondary analysis between less than 500 hectares and more than 500 
hectares (x2 = 5.535, df = 1, p<0.02; Ʈb = 0.292, p = 0.02).  
5.3.4 Attitudes and perceptions 
5.3.4.1 Problem awareness and attribution  
Problem awareness was measured through four statements; respondents reported the degree 
to which they agreed: “Dairy farming impacts surface and ground water quality”; “Water 
quality affects human health”; “Water quality affects livestock health”; and “Water quality 
affects pasture/crop health”. Attribution included two statements: “My farming practices 
did not contribute to the need for environmental regulation on farm”; and “Environmental 
regulation on farm was necessary to improve water quality”. Statement responses were 
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coded for analysis using two categories: strongly agree to agree; and neutral to strongly 
disagree.     
Table 5.23 Relationship between compliance and problem awareness and attribution  
    Compliance  
Dairy impacts (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
66  
0.128  
0.721  
Water quality: human health (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
66  
0.026  
0.872  
Water quality: livestock health (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
66  
0.396  
0.529  
Water quality: pasture/crop health (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
65  
1.438  
0.230  
Practices contributing to need for regulation (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
66  
1.755  
0.185  
Regulation required to improve water quality (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
66  
0.168  
0.682  
a Parenthesis denotes number of categories  
There is no evidence in this analysis suggesting any significant relationships between 
compliance level and problem awareness or attribution survey items (Table 5.23).  
5.3.4.2 Environmental perceptions 
Environmental perceptions included two averages taken from four questions relating to 
biospheric concern and five questions relating to threat of environmental risks – Cronbach’s 
α suggested that the questions had enough reliability to be taken as an average (biospheric 
concern α = 0.91; environmental risks α = 0.79). Both classifications were analysed using 
two categories: very threatening to neutral-threatening; and neutral to not very threatening 
for environmental risks and very concerning to neutral-concerning; and neutral to not very 
concerning for biospheric concern. 
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Table 5.24 Relationship between compliance and environmental perceptions  
    Compliance  
Biospheric concern (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
66  
1.017  
0.313  
Environmental risks (2)  n  
x2  
Sig.  
66  
0.903  
0.342  
a Parenthesis denotes number of categories  
There is no evidence to suggest any significant relationships between compliance level and 
biospheric concern and environmental risk perceptions (Table 5.24).  
5.3.4.3 Equity perceptions  
Equity perceptions included four statements whereby respondents reported the degree to which 
they agreed: that “Canterbury farmers are unfairly impacted by environmental regulation”; 
“Nitrate limits are applied fairly to all farmers”; “Environmental regulation is fair to all 
farmers”; and that “The cost of environmental protection is equitably spread across society”. 
Statement responses were coded for secondary analysis using two categories: strongly agree to 
agree; and neutral to strongly disagree. Respondents were also asked to choose which group in 
society should have the primary responsibility of managing the environment in a sustainable 
manner. 
Table 5.25 Relationship between compliance and equity perceptions  
    Compliance  
Canterbury farmers unfairly impacted (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
66  
0.985  
0.321  
Nitrate limits applied fairly (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
66  
0.145  
0.703  
Regulation fair to all farmers (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
66  
0.131  
0.718  
Equitable cost spread (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
65  
0.123  
0.726  
Group responsible for environmental protection (3)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
66  
11.669  
0.009**  
a Parenthesis denotes number of categories  
**(p<0.01)  
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There is no evidence suggesting a statistically significant relationship between compliance level 
and the Likert scale statements on equity perceptions. However, there is evidence that suggests 
a significant relationship between compliance level and the response to which group in society 
should have the primary responsibility to manage the environment sustainably (Table 5.25). A 
larger percentage of non-compliant respondents felt the responsibility fell more on national or 
local governments than did compliant respondents (29 versus 14 per cent); a larger percentage 
of the non-compliant felt the responsibility fell on private landowners than did compliant 
respondents (14 versus five per cent); one non-compliant respondent felt the responsibility 
belonged to no one. A larger percentage of compliant respondents felt the responsibility 
belonged to everyone than did non-compliant respondents (81 versus 43 per cent).   
5.3.4.4 Regulation perceptions  
Regulatory perceptions included 12 Likert scale statements relating to respondents’ 
understanding of regulation; beliefs about future regulatory restrictions; compliance costs; 
inspections; and the regulatory process. Eight statements had their responses coded for 
secondary analysis using two categories: strongly agree to agree; and neutral to strongly 
disagree. Respondents were also asked to choose which method of intervention they felt 
provides the best results in reducing nitrate leaching. This was coded between with and without 
the use of government legislation.   
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Table 5.26 Relationship between compliance and regulation perceptions  
    Compliance  
Easy to understand need for compliance (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
66  
0.483  
0.487  
Easy access to information (2)  n  
x2  
Sig.  
66  
10.738  
0.001***  
I am informed on regulation (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
66  
0.841  
0.359  
Future regulation uncertainty (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
66  
0.912  
0.340  
Compliance takes a lot of time (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
66  
0.118  
0.731  
Compliance takes a lot of money (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
65  
0.245  
0.621  
Inspections frequent enough to deter violations (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
66  
0.028  
0.867  
I intend to comply due to potential penalty (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
65  
0.152  
0.696  
Method that provides best results (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
65  
1.165  
0.280  
Ease for ECAN to detect non-compliance (5)  n  
U  
Sig.  
66  
124  
0.065*  
Likelihood of receiving penalty (5)  n  
U  
Sig.  
66  
157.5  
0.257  
Experience with ECAN inspections (5)  n  
U  
Sig.  
66  
125.5  
0.058*  
Experience with regulatory process (5)  n  
U  
Sig.  
66  
118.5  
0.046**  
a Parenthesis denotes number of categories 
*(p<0.10), **(p<0.05), ***(p<0.01)  
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There is no evidence suggesting a statistically significant relationship between compliance level 
and 10 of the survey items relating to regulatory perceptions (Table 5.26). There is evidence to 
suggest a strong positive relationship between non-compliance and the perception of the ease 
of access to information on regulatory and compliance requirements (Ʈb = 0.4, p = 0.001). All 
non-compliant respondents fell in the neutral to strongly disagree category on whether they felt 
they had easy access to information, while the majority of compliant respondents (63 per cent) 
agreed that they did have easy access to information. There is evidence at the p<0.1 level, to 
suggest a relationship between non-compliance and the likelihood of ECAN detecting 
noncompliance (a measure of fear over the probability of being caught), in that non-compliance 
is positively associated with a feeling that it is difficult for ECAN to detect non-compliance (U 
= 124, N1 = 60, N2 = 7, p<0.1, Tc = 0.153). There is evidence to suggest a relationship between 
compliance level and experience with the regulatory process. The rating respondents provided 
for the regulatory process decreased with non-compliance (U=118.5, N1=60, N2=7, p<0.05). 
There is also evidence suggesting a weak significant relationship between compliance level and 
experience with the inspections. The rating respondents provided for the inspections decreased 
with non-compliance at the p<0.1 level.   
5.3.5 Subjective norms 
5.3.5.1 Injunctive social norms  
Injunctive social norms included five Likert scale statements whereby respondents reported the 
degree to which they agreed: whether if non-compliant, their reputation would be harmed; if 
operating the way the public expects them to regarding their consents was important; whether 
other farmers would disapprove if they were non-compliant and if they felt pressure from the 
farming community to comply; and whether people close to them would be disappointed if they 
were not compliant.   
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Table 5.27 Relationship between compliance and injunctive social norms  
    Compliance  
Reputation (2)  n     
x2 
Sig.  
67  
1.541  
0.215  
Operating the way the public expects (2)  n     
x2 
Sig.  
67  
0.000  
0.989  
Other farmers would disapprove (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
66  
1.097  
0.295  
Pressure from farming community (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
67  
0.021  
0.884  
Friends and family would disapprove (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
67  
0.420  
0.517  
a Parenthesis denotes number of categories  
There is no evidence to suggest any significant relationships between compliance level and 
injunctive social norms (Table 5.27).  
5.3.5.2 Descriptive social norms  
Descriptive social norms included three statements whereby respondents reported the degree to 
which they agreed: that the majority of New Zealand farmers are usually compliant with their 
consents; most farmers they know personally are usually compliant; and that occasional 
noncompliance is a common phenomenon. 
Table 5.28 Relationship between compliance and descriptive social norms  
    Compliance  
Majority of farmers usually comply (2)  n  
x2  
Sig.  
67  
0.366  
0.545  
Most farmers I know are compliant (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
67  
0.630  
0.427  
Occasional non-compliance common (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
67  
1.057  
0.304  
a Parenthesis denotes number of categories  
There is no evidence to suggest any significant relationships between compliance level and 
descriptive social norms (Table 5.28).  
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5.3.6 Perceived behavioural control  
Perceived behavioural control included four statements whereby respondents reported the 
degree to which they agreed: whether they were confident and intended to be compliant at their 
next inspection; the nature of their historical compliance; and their internal locus of control.  
Table 5.29 Relationship between compliance and perceived behavioural control  
    Compliance  
Confident in achieving compliance at next 
inspection  
(2)  
n  
x2 
Sig.  
66  
11.384  
0.001**  
Intend to be compliant (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
66  
9.493  
0.002**  
Historical compliance (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
66  
9.237  
0.002**  
Locus of control (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
67  
0.562  
0.454  
a Parenthesis denotes number of categories 
**(p<0.01)  
Three of the perceived behavioural control items appeared to be related to compliance level. 
There was no relationship between locus of control and compliance (Table 5.29). All 
respondents agreed they were confident in achieving compliance and intended to be compliant 
at next inspection. However, those who were compliant felt more strongly about their intention 
and confidence in being compliant at their next inspection. Additionally, more compliant 
respondents had strong historical compliance compared with non-compliant respondents in the 
past five seasons.   
5.3.7 Perceived financial control  
Perceived financial control included two statements whereby respondents reported the degree 
to which they agreed with: whether a lower milk payout would affect compliance and whether 
compliance relies heavily on farm financial circumstances.  
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Table 5.30 Relationship between compliance and perceived financial control  
    Compliance  
Payout affecting compliance (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
67  
1.262  
0.261  
Compliance relies on finances (2)  n  
x2 
Sig.  
67  
0.372  
0.542  
a Parenthesis denotes number of categories  
There is no evidence suggesting any significant relationships between compliance level and 
perceived financial control (Table 5.30). 
5.4 Text analysis 
5.4.1 Introduction  
This section provides an analysis of the open-ended question posed to respondents asking them 
for a few sentences on their ratings of ECAN inspections and the regulatory process. The 
responses were coded for analysis based on the overall tone of the comment – be it negative, 
positive, neutral, or containing positive and negative elements. This was further broken down 
by positive and negative comments regarding inspections, regulation and implementation of 
regulation. Section 5.4.2 presents some of the responses received based on their tone and topic 
(a full catalogue of responses can be found in Appendix G). Section 5.4.3 presents the bivariate 
analysis of the text with the ratings for inspections and the regulatory process and compliance 
levels.  
5.4.2 Responses to open-ended question regarding ECAN inspections and regulation  
5.4.2.1 Positive responses  
Of respondents who rated their experiences with ECAN inspections and the regulatory process, 
48 provided comments on the reasoning for their ratings. There were no positive comments 
regarding regulation itself; two positive comments about the regulatory implementation 
process; 18 comments regarding inspections; and two other positive comments. A selection of 
comments is set out in Table 5.31. Notably, approximately 28 per cent of the positive comments 
regarding inspections used language suggesting that experiences were not consistently positive.  
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Table 5.31 Positive comments on ECAN inspections and regulation  
Tone and topic  Comment  
Positive:   
Regulation  
implementation  
process   
Count = 2  
- “So far getting consents through and advice on native 
planting season and plans have been well looked after and 
pretty straight forward.”  
- “Had a non-compliance on water take, which was handled 
well by ECAN.”  
Positive:    
Inspections  
Count = 18    
- “Fair and reasonable assessment, good dialogue with 
assessor prior to final report, collaborative approach.” 
- “In most cases the standard and competency of the audits 
and auditors was good.”  
  - “Very friendly and understanding staff.”  
 - “On most occasions staff have been thorough and polite 
and offered good advice on any minor compliance issues.”  
 - “For the most part, ECAN inspections of effluent and 
water use have been good.”  
 - “ECAN staff that have visited our farms have always been 
courteous, interested in what we are doing and ready to 
offer advice if sought.”  
Positive: Other    
Count = 2   
- “No problems with ECAN.” 
- “Helpful easy to understand.”  
  
5.4.2.2 Negative responses 
For negative comments concerning the ratings, there was a total of 11 comments on regulation; 
11 comments regarding the regulatory implementation process; and 12 comments regarding 
inspections. A few of the comments are set out in Table 5.32. 
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Table 5.32 Negative comments on ECAN inspections and regulation  
Tone and topic  Comment  
Negative:    
Regulation  
Count =11    
- “ECAN is going through the motion ticking the boxes. They 
are not interested in science measurement on farm.” 
“Confusing rules and changing goals all the time.”  
  - “Regulatory process moves too slowly and needs to be based 
on good science.”  
  - “ECAN takes everything very black and white. There is not 
much experience with different type of farming systems (i.e. 
free stall).”  
Negative:    
Regulation 
implementation  
process    
Count = 11  
  
- “They come around once a year, we have always been 
reasonably compliant and so never have a problem, but I 
know of farmers who do not practice best practice and 
nothing is ever done.”  
- “I was recently (previous season) fined for significant 
noncompliance. The process was very stressful and totally 
out of context to the offence.”  
    
  
- “Poor communication from ECAN to farmers of policy, 
regulations and amended requirements.”  
    
  
  
- “Regulatory process has at various times been very 
protracted, appearing wasteful of time and monetary 
resources, to achieve the same outcome as was initially 
applied for. Very expensive to justify any changes to a 
resource consent, and difficult to keep up with environmental 
changes that occur during a consent change process.”  
Negative:    
Inspections  
Count = 12    
  
  
- “Dealing with some staff difficult due to their inexperience. 
Seems to be high turnover of staff.”  
- “The approach of trying to catch farmers out with short 
notice inspections is very threatening. Experience from 
other authorities suggests that there is better engagement 
where inspectors are working with rather than against 
consent holders.”  
    
  
- “The monitoring staff are young and inexperienced and on 
the right side of environmentalism i.e. not neutral.”  
  - “An aggressive attitude of inspectors with very poor 
practical skills. Consenting staff also lack common sense.”  
  
5.4.2.3 Other responses 
There were four comments with a tone implying inspections and the regulatory process have 
improved or where the tone could not be discerned from the comment provided. Comments can 
be seen in full in Table 5.33.  
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Table 5.33 Other comments on ECAN inspections and regulation  
Tone   Comment  
Improving   
Count = 2  
- “They have changed from being only regulatory and 
somewhat unhelpful to being very helpful.”  
  - “Attitudes of ECAN staff have improved over the last few 
years, able to work with the consent holder.”  
Other    
Count = 2    
- “Limited interactions.”  
- “They only did what was necessary.”  
 
5.4.3 Bivariate analysis of text  
Section 5.4.3 presents the bivariate analysis of the text by tone and topic with the ratings for 
inspections and the regulatory process and compliance levels.  
5.4.3.1 Positive comments  
Analysis of positive comments included comments with an overall positive tone; positive 
regulatory implementation process and positive inspection comments. Table 5.34 presents the 
results of an analysis among positive comments and regulatory process and inspection ratings 
and compliance level.  
Table 5.34 Positive comments analysis  
    Regulatory 
process 
rating  
Inspection 
rating  
Compliance  
Overall positive comments  
(13)  
n   
U/ x2 
Sig.  
35  
16.5  
0.000**  
35  
51.5  
0.001**  
48  
4.236  
0.120  
Regulatory implementation 
process (2)  
N  
U/ x2  
Sig.  
48  
11  
0.057  
48  
6  
0.025*  
48  
0.298  
0.585  
Inspections (18)  n   
U/ x2 
Sig.  
48  
215.5  
0.221  
48  
124.5  
0.001**  
48  
1.270  
0.260  
a Parenthesis denotes number of comments  
*(p<0.05), **(p<0.01)  
  
There is no evidence of a relationship between positive comments and compliance level. There 
is evidence of significant relationships between overall positive comments and the rating of the 
regulatory process and inspections. All respondents who had positive comments about 
inspections and the regulatory process rated their experience with both as excellent or good. 
The inspection rating also had significant relationships with positive comments regarding the 
regulatory implementation process and inspections.   
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5.4.3.2 Negative comments 
Analysis of negative comments included comments with an overall negative tone; negative 
regulation, regulatory implementation process, and inspection comments. Table 5.35 presents 
the results of an analysis between comments and regulatory process and inspection ratings and 
compliance level.  
Table 5.35 Negative comments analysis  
    Regulatory 
process 
rating  
Inspection 
rating  
Compliance  
Overall negative comments  
(22)  
n   
U/ x2 
Sig.  
35  
16.5  
0.000**  
35  
51.5  
0.001**  
48  
4.236  
0.120  
Regulation (11)  n  
U/ x2  
Sig.  
48  
130  
0.057  
48  
192  
0.759  
48  
2.039  
0.153  
Regulatory implementation 
process (11)  
n   
U/ x2 
Sig.  
48  
103.5  
0.001**  
48  
191  
0.172  
48  
4.003  
0.045*  
Inspections (12)  n   
U/ x2 
Sig.  
48  
136.5  
0.278  
48  
52.5  
0.000**  
48  
0.957  
0.328  
a Parenthesis denotes number of comments  
*(p<0.05), **(p<0.01)  
  
There is evidence of a significant relationship between the overall tone of comments and the 
rating of the regulatory process and inspections. Negative comments had lower ratings than 
positive comment ratings. The only significant relationship for compliance was with comments 
on the regulatory implementation process. The majority of non-compliant respondents had 
negative comments about the implementation process, while the majority of compliant 
respondents did not. There is also evidence of significant relationships between the ratings for 
inspections and comments on inspections; and ratings for the regulatory process and comments 
on the implementation process.   
5.5 Regression analysis   
5.5.1 Evaluation of the conceptual model: Logistic regression analysis  
The variables representing the major constructs of perceived control, norms and attitudes and 
perceptions within the conceptual model presented in Chapter 4 were evaluated for their 
reliability in measuring the same constructs using Cronbach’s α (Appendix H). Consent holder 
and farm characteristics included in the regression were age; years in the dairy industry; 
education level; information source point usage (workshop attendance and consultant use); farm 
 63  
  
size (hectares and number of milking livestock); and years of dairy operating profit. An average 
for attitudes and perceptions covered equity; regulation; physical environment; problem 
awareness; and attribution. Subjective norms included descriptive and injunctive norms and an 
average was calculated for perceived behavioural control (minus locus of control) and 
perceived financial control.   
The results of the binary logistic regression evaluating the conceptual model showed an 
acceptable goodness of fit (Nagelkerke = 0.749, Hosmer and Lemeshow p-value = 0.992). 
However, it only revealed one statistically significant variable – farm size at p<0.1. This is 
likely due to a multi-collinearity issue among the indices. There are a few options available 
when faced with multi-collinearity. First, to do nothing, which has been supported by Conlisk 
(1971), Blanchard (1987) and Kennedy (1992, p. 181). Alternatively, for this study, additional 
information could be incorporated either by expanding the sample size or by dropping a 
variable: this strategy allowed for perceived behavioural control to become significant at p<0.1 
when the age variable was omitted (Kennedy, 1992, pp. 181-182). However, omitting variables 
can lead to model misspecification (Kennedy, 1992, p. 184). It is difficult to make any definitive 
statements about the impact of variables in this model on compliance given that little 
significance among the variables was offered. Full results from this logistic regression are 
available in Appendix I.  
5.5.2 Final logistic regression  
Given the issues presented by the evaluation of the conceptual model, a regression was 
performed with a smaller set of variables. The predictor variables included in the second logistic 
regression were selected based on the significant relationships identified in the bivariate 
analysis and the major constructs of the conceptual model to further explore, and give a better 
indication of, the effects of significant relationships. The variables are described in Table 5.36.  
The results of the logistic regression analysis are provided in Table 5.37.    
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Although controversial, the pseudo R2 values are often used to assist in determining the overall 
fit of the model. In this case, the Nagelkerke value (0.693) suggested that the final model 
represents a reasonable improvement over the base model (with no independent variables). The 
Hosmer and Lemeshow statistic indicates that the model is a good fit for the observed data with 
an associated p value of 0.955 (>0.05).  
In this model there are three statistically significant variables: confidence in achieving full 
compliance at the next inspection (a measure of perceived behavioural control); ease of access 
to information (a measure of attitudes and perceptions); and beliefs about how non-compliance 
would affect the respondents’ reputation (a measure of subjective norms). Holding all other 
independent variables at their mean, the marginal effect of these variables on the probability of 
non-compliance can be determined (Table 5.38).  
Table 5.38 Marginal effects of significant variables  
Variable  Marginal effect  
PBC  0.064539778  
AP1  0.15579527  
SN  0.008116  
As there are only two categories chosen for confidence (very confident and confident), it can 
be determined that for individuals with average values for other predictor variables, the 
predicted probability of non-compliance is 0.065 greater for an individual that is confident than 
for an individual who is very confident.   
The impact of access to information on the probability of non-compliance depends on how 
much access the consent holders perceive they have to information. The largest marginal effect 
for access to information, when holding all other predictors at their means, is from neutral to 
disagree, where the predicted probability of non-compliance is 0.032 greater for an individual 
who disagrees that they have easy access to information than for an individual who is neutral. 
The other largest marginal effect for access to information, when holding all other predictors at 
their means, is from disagree to strongly disagree (Table 5.38), where the predicted probability 
of non-compliance is 0.156 greater for an individual who strongly disagrees that they have easy 
access to information than for an individual who disagrees. Finally, the probability of 
noncompliance is 0.008 less for an individual who strongly agrees that their reputation as a 
farmer would be harmed if they were found non-compliant over an individual who does not 
strongly agree.   
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5.6 Summary  
The data analysis presented in this chapter was directed by research questions one and two. The 
univariate analysis, which used descriptive statistics to characterise single variables, was 
utilised to develop a ‘profile’ of dairy effluent consent holders and their farm characteristics; 
their attitudes toward and perceptions of the environment, equity and regulation; their 
subjective norms; and perceived control. The bivariate analysis was used to explore potential 
relationships between the above noted categories and compliance level. The text analysis 
section analysed the qualitative data collected from responses as to the reasoning for 
respondent’s rating of ECAN inspections and regulation. A multivariate analysis was utilised 
to evaluate the conceptual model and determine the relationship between multiple explanatory 
variables and compliance.   
5.6.1 Significant findings  
The bivariate analysis revealed 11 statistically significant relationships between explanatory 
variables and compliance with environmental regulation. For consent holder and farm 
characteristics, there is evidence to suggest the existence of a positive relationship between 
workshop training and/or farm group meeting attendance and non-compliance and a strong 
positive relationship between non-compliance and farm size and the number of livestock being 
milked on farm.   
For equity perceptions, there is evidence to suggest a significant relationship between 
compliance level and the response to which group in society should have the primary 
responsibility to sustainably manage the environment. A larger percentage of non-compliant 
respondents felt that the responsibility falls more on national or local governments than 
compliant respondents (29 versus 14 per cent) and a larger percentage of compliant respondents 
felt the responsibility belongs to everyone than non-compliant respondents (81 versus 43 per 
cent).   
On attitudes toward regulation, there is evidence to suggest a strong relationship between ease 
of access to information on the requirements of compliance and compliance status: 
noncompliance was associated with increasing disagreement that they had easy access to 
information. There is evidence suggesting a relationship between the ease with which 
respondents felt ECAN could detect non-compliance – with non-compliance associated with a 
belief that it is more difficult for non-compliance to be detected. There is also a relationship 
between the rating given for the regulatory process and inspections and non-compliance – 
noncompliance being associated with a decrease in the rating. Lastly, non-compliance was 
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correlated with confidence in respondents’ ability and intention to comply at the next inspection 
and historical non-compliance: compliance was associated with stronger agreement on feeling 
confident and intention and a stronger history of compliance.  
The text analysis contained 22 positive comments toward the regulatory implementation 
process, inspections; 34 negative comments toward the regulation, regulatory implementation 
process and inspections; and two comments suggesting inspections and the regulatory 
implementation process had improved over the past several years.  
The logistic regression was used to evaluate the conceptual model and explore the relationships 
between explanatory variables selected based on the significant relationships identified in the 
bivariate analysis and the major constructs of the conceptual model and compliance. The 
predictor variables in the final regression included: number of animals being milked on farm; 
ease of access to information about requirements on farm to be compliant with environmental 
regulation; how easy respondents felt it is for ECAN to detect non-compliance; whether 
noncompliance would harm their reputation; and confidence that they will be compliant at their 
next inspection. Three variables from this regression were found to be significant: access to 
information (an explanatory variable related to attitudes and perception), how respondents felt 
non-compliance would affect their reputation and confidence (an explanatory variable 
representing perceived behavioural control). The odds of non-compliance in this model 
increased with a decrease in confidence, decreased with a feeling that their reputation would be 
harmed if non-compliant and an increase in feeling that they do not have easy access to the 
information required to be compliant. Chapter 6 will discuss the key findings presented in this 
chapter relative to the literature presented in Chapter 2.    
    
  
 68  
  
Chapter 6 
Discussion and recommendations 
6.1 Introduction 
The two primary research objectives in this study were to determine what factors influence full 
compliance with diary effluent discharge consents in Canterbury and which of those factors are 
critical in influencing compliance. The previous chapter presented the results from the 
quantitative and text analyses. In this chapter, those findings will be integrated into a discussion. 
The significant findings associated with compliance are explored in relation to the literature 
presented in Chapter 2.   
Section 6.2 presents the major findings of this study. This is followed by a discussion of each 
of the findings and answers research questions one and two: “What are the factors influencing 
dairy effluent discharge consent compliance in the study area?” and “what are the critical factors 
influencing dairy effluent discharge consent compliance?” This section will also evaluate the 
conceptual model presented in Chapter 4.   
Section 6.3 provides a discussion on compliance and addresses the third research objective to:  
“Make recommendations to inform policy and industry stakeholders.” Key recommendations 
include opportunities to increase access to information, hedge feelings of uncertainty and 
promote engagement.   
Section 6.4 will discuss some of this study’s limitations, contributions and future research 
opportunities. Section 6.5 will present conclusions.   
6.2 Discussion of significant findings  
6.2.1 Significant findings  
The results indicate that 11 variables are significantly related to compliance behaviour in the 
bivariate analysis, and four variables were significant predictors of the log-odds of 
noncompliance in the logistic regression. This section discusses the variables in detail, in order 
of their relative significance: access to information; confidence; intention and historical 
compliance; societal group responsible for environmental management; the number of milking 
livestock on farm; farm size; training and workshop attendance; rating of regulatory processes 
and inspections; fear of the likelihood of being caught and reputation in relation to the literature 
presented in Chapter 2.   
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6.2.2 Access to information  
The results of the bivariate and multivariate analyses both showed a strong relationship between 
perceived access to information on compliance requirements and compliance. Non-compliance 
was associated with an increase in the perception that information was difficult to access. In the 
bivariate analysis, access to information was significantly related to non-compliance at the 
p=0.001 level and in the multivariate analysis, significant at p<0.01.   
In a study of dairy effluent consent compliance by Davies, et al. (2007) in the Waikato region, 
farmers were concerned over a perceived lack of access to technical information and unbiased 
advice. Other research points to knowledge gaps as barriers to achieving compliance, as well 
as adopting environmentally sustainable practices (Van Reenen, 2012; Winter & May, 2001). 
In this study, access to information did not have a significant relationship with the use of 
consultants for environmental planning and performance. However, only eight per cent of 
respondents who reported using consultant services, used them for environmental advice. This 
lack of use may reflect a similar concern voiced by the Waikato farmers. Davies, et al. (2007), 
found that farmers in Waikato relied heavily on consultants, their own and other farmers’ 
experiences, articles and suppliers to inform their decisions about management related to 
compliance. Whether consent holders in Canterbury use the same breadth of resources to make 
compliance decisions is unknown, but may account for some of the perception that information 
on the specific requirements to maintain compliance is difficult to obtain, particularly when 
there is a general feeling of uncertainty over future regulatory restrictions among the sample as 
a whole.   
6.2.3 Confidence, intention and historical compliance  
The results of the bivariate and multivariate analyses both indicate that non-compliance is 
related to confidence in the respondents’ ability to comply with their consent conditions at their 
next inspection. In the bivariate analysis, confidence was significantly related to noncompliance 
at the p=0.001 level and in the multivariate analysis, significantly associated at p<0.05. All 
respondents agreed that they felt confident in their ability to comply; however, noncompliance 
was associated with feeling confident to a lesser degree. A similar result was shown in the 
bivariate analysis regarding intention to comply at the next inspection: non-compliance was 
significantly associated with intention at the p<0.01 level. All respondents also agreed that they 
intended to comply; however, they intended to a lesser degree. Historical compliance was also 
related to non-compliance at the p<0.01 level.  
Both confidence and intention are integral parts of RAA theory. Confidence is part of an 
individual’s capacity in perceived behavioural control and can influence an individual’s 
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intention to perform a certain behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p. 22). Capacity is related to 
how confident an individual is in their capability to perform a behaviour and that they have 
control over the behaviour. Perceived behavioural control can influence behaviour directly or 
indirectly through intention (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p. 22). Intention is determined largely by 
attitudes, norms and perceived behavioural control. Perceived behavioural control can influence 
intention, as it reflects limiting or encouraging factors that could affect behaviour (Beedell & 
Rehman, 1999). Confidence and intention are significantly associated in this study at the p<0.01 
level, which is consistent with results presented by Borges et al. (2014) and Lynne et al. (1995), 
but is in contrast to Menozzi et al. (2014) and Wauters et al. (2010) who found perceived 
behavioural control to be not significant. Theory and empirical observations help account for 
the lack of consistency in significant findings within the indirect influences on intention, in that 
the literature suggests the effect attitudes, norms and perceived behavioural control have may 
fluctuate depending on the behaviour being examined (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p. 22).  
Menozzi et al. (2014), in their study of farmers’ motivations to adopt sustainable agricultural 
practices, found that historical behaviour had a positive impact on intentions to adopt 
sustainable practices. That finding is confirmed in this study, where historical non-compliance 
is associated at p<0.01 with a lower intention rating. However, it is important to note that 
intention and perceived behavioural control are not necessarily the cause of a behaviour. Both 
theory and empirical results show that even if the intention to perform a behaviour is present, 
the behaviour may not be performed (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2010; Borges et al., 2014). RAA 
assumes that intention is one of the most important predictors of behaviour, however, it is also 
recognised that individuals may not have sufficient control over the behaviour (actual control 
may over-ride intention) to act on their intentions: they may not have the technical know-how, 
or environmental factors may inhibit their ability to act (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p. 22), as also 
discussed in the findings presented by Borges et al. (2014).   
6.2.4 Societal group responsible for environmental management  
Beliefs around the group in society responsible for managing the environment in a sustainable 
manner was a significant variable in the bivariate analysis at the p<0.01 level. A larger 
percentage of non-compliant respondents felt the responsibility fell more on national or local 
governments than compliant respondents (29 versus 14 per cent); and a larger percentage of 
non-compliant consent holders felt the responsibility fell on private landowners (14 versus five 
per cent). A larger percentage of compliant respondents than non-compliant respondents also 
felt the responsibility belonged to everyone (81 versus 43 per cent).   
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In a discussion on the regulatory arrangements with Danish farmers, US homebuilders and 
boatyard operators in the US, May (2005) highlights the differences between regulation as a 
societal contract and a ‘typical’ regulatory arrangement. The result of this study, with a larger 
percentage of non-compliant consent holders feeling that private landowners should have the 
primary responsibility of sustainable environmental management, seems contradictory. It 
portrays a sense of duty among non-complaint respondents to ensure they are operating in a 
sustainable manner. Compliance with environmental regulation would be considered the ‘bare 
minimum’ of environmentally sustainable management. This exhibits a key part of a societal 
contract: farmers feel obligated to fulfil their responsibilities.   
Conversely, respondents as a whole largely felt their farm practices did not contribute to the 
need for regulation and that current regulation is inequitable. This may represent a feeling that 
government-driven influence on farm management decisions is an intrusion. A larger 
percentage of compliant respondents feeling that everyone is responsible may also reflect a 
societal contract. Compliant farmers are fulfilling their responsibilities by complying with 
environmental regulation (while others in society may not be pulling their weight), despite 
respondents as a whole largely feeling that the costs are not spread equitably across society 
(cost spread was not associated with compliance).   
6.2.5 Farm size and number of milking livestock  
As farm size in hectares generally increases with an increase in the number of milking livestock 
on farm to support the operation, size in both will be discussed jointly in this section. In the 
bivariate analysis, there was a positive relationship between the number of livestock being 
milked on farm and farm size and non-compliance at the p<0.02 and at the p<0.1 level in the 
regression model which evaluated the conceptual model.  
 In the innovation adoption literature, Yule and Eastwood (2011) suggest larger farms have a 
greater need for technological innovations due to management complexities and a scarcity of 
skilled labour. Whether the positive relationship between farm size and non-compliance found 
here is in part caused by the same issues Yule and Eastwood (2011) cite for a greater need for 
innovation is uncertain. However, almost half of the respondents who reported being 
noncompliant did reference management issues as a reason for their non-compliance. In a 
review of farm-level adoption of conservation practices, Knowler and Bradshaw (2007) 
reported that most of the empirical studies found farm size to be insignificant with respect to 
conservation behaviour.    
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6.2.6 Training and workshop attendance  
The results from the bivariate analysis showed that attending training workshops and farm 
group meetings was significantly related to non-compliance. In the bivariate analysis, training 
workshop and farm group meeting attendance was positively associated with non-compliance 
at the p<0.05 level. 
While this is in contrast to literature presented by Traore et al. (1998), Suwunnamek and 
Suwanmaneepong (2011), Ganpat et al. (2014) and Zingiro et al. (2014), a possible explanation 
for the counter-intuitive result may come from the relationship ECAN has with the milk 
companies that collect from consent holders. Subsequent discussions with ECAN revealed that 
it shares consent data with milk processors, enabling processors to then target non-compliant 
farmers for training and workshop sessions (Richard Purdon, personal communication, October 
18, 2016).    
6.2.7 Rating of regulatory processes and inspections  
The results of the bivariate analysis showed that the rating of the regulatory process and 
inspections were related to non-compliance, as non-compliance was associated with a lower 
rating of the regulatory process at the p<0.05 level and inspections at the p<0.10 level. This is 
consistent with literature on compliance from the agricultural and natural resources sector 
(May, 2005; Tyler, 1990).   
For regulation to be effective, it is important that regulatees acknowledge their responsibility to 
comply. Even with enforcement actions in place, absent a majority of regulatees obeying due 
to their sense of duty to adhere to the rules, a much stronger enforcement tool would be required 
(May, 2005; Tyler, 1990). This sense of duty is based on a moral obligation to comply; an 
agreement that there is a need for regulation; and that the approach taken is appropriate (Scholz 
& Pinney, 1995; Winter & May 2001; May 2005). Acceptance of a regulatory approach is 
dependent on the perceived reasonableness, degree of trust in the organisations promulgating 
rules and the perceived extent to which other contemporaries are doing their part (Scholz & 
Lubell, 1998; May, 2005). In this case, respondents largely felt there was a need for regulation 
and that on an industry level, there was general acknowledgement of the negative effects of 
dairy farming on the environment and a need for regulation. Additionally, as shown in the 
univariate analysis section, respondents felt pressure from within the agricultural community 
and the broader public to comply with effluent regulation. However, the qualitative responses 
(examples shown below) regarding regulation and the regulatory implementation process, show 
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these are largely perceived as not reasonable and that their contemporaries are not doing their 
part:  
“Very unfair when we have neighbours both above and below us seemingly on different rules 
regarding stock in waterways with beef cattle and dairy grazing operations.”  
 
“They come around once a year, we have always been reasonably compliant and so never have 
a problem, but I know of farmers who do not practice best practice and nothing is ever done.”  
 
“Regulations need to be based on real science, not assumed science. More research needed, 
not using assumptions.”  
The qualitative responses provided context for the rating of the regulatory process and rating of 
inspections. Here non-compliance may be associated with a poor rating of the regulatory 
process as among most respondents, particularly those who were non-compliant, there was not 
a universal acceptance that the regulation was reasonable or equitable (see Section 5.2.3.4 for 
further elaboration).   
The rating of inspections was also associated with non-compliance, although more weakly 
related than ratings of the regulatory process. The negative comments pointed to perceived 
inexperience and poor attitudes of inspectors (Appendix G). Interactions between inspecting 
agencies and regulated bodies can be an important pre-cursor of compliance behaviour (Winter 
& May, 2001; May, 2005). Inspection interactions that promote joint problem-solving between 
inspectors and regulatees and develop relationships between the two bodies can have a positive 
effect on compliance (Winter & May, 2001; May, 2005).    
6.2.8 Fear of detection and reputation   
There was evidence at the p<0.1 level suggesting a relationship between non-compliance and 
the likelihood of ECAN detecting non-compliance (a measure of fear over the probability of 
being caught). Compliance is positively associated with a feeling that it is easier for ECAN to 
detect non-compliance. Deterrent fears have had a variable impact on compliance in previous 
empirical studies. This is largely due to the differences in regulatory situations and the structure 
of compliance relationships which can occur because of differences in culture or styles of 
regulation (Gormley & Peters, 1992; Axelrad & Kagan, 2000; May, 2005).    
The results of this study are in contrast to May (2005) and Winter and May (2001), in which 
respondents had a relatively high sense of civic duty and relatively high deterrent fears. For 
Danish farmers, May (2005) suggests that the regulatory environment is framed as a societal 
contract – an emphasis is placed on the obligations of farmers to comply and in return, 
enforcement takes an accommodating approach. This is reinforced by the involvement of 
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farmers’ unions and organisations in setting guidelines and rules and negotiating regulatory 
implementation (Winter & May, 2001). The difference between Danish farmers and Canterbury 
effluent consent holders about deterrent fears may stem from the perception that enforcement 
is not overly accommodating in the New Zealand context, as seen in some of the comments 
regarding negative experiences with the regulatory implementation process:   
“They do an okay job now after doing a poor regulatory job for years...They are now catching 
up which is good, but being a bit too officious and probably need to work with farmers rather 
than against us, which is disappointing.”  
 
“We had a massive problem with ECAN regarding a water consent which cost us many 
thousands of dollars with a lawyer and stress which impacted on my farming operation.”  
Additionally, only in the past few years did ECAN launch the MGM and Portal system in 
conjunction with industry organisations. Higher deterrent fears may have resulted from a lack 
of involvement of producer organisations at the onset.  With little opportunity for consent 
holders to negotiate over the terms of compliance, this would have represented a more officious 
regulatory environment.  
There was also evidence at the p<0.1 level in the final regression analysis to suggest a 
relationship between feeling that non-compliance would harm the respondents’ reputation and 
non-compliance. Compliance is positively associated with a strong feeling that non-compliance 
harms their reputation. Reputation is inherently tied to a sense of duty. This finding conforms 
to literature suggesting a relatively high sense of duty among respondents is an important 
contributing factor in achieving compliant behaviour (Grasmick, Bursik & Kinsey, 1991; 
Scholz & Pinney, 1995; Winter & May, 2001).  
6.2.9 Evaluation of the conceptual model 
The conceptual model laid out in Chapter 4 was tested in the study and is presented below. The 
solid lines indicated a direct influence with arrows showing the assumed direction of the 
relationship. Consent holder and farmer characteristics referred to socio-demographics and 
operational characteristics. Attitudes and perceptions related to factors such as values and 
interests, categorised by perceptions towards the environment, equity, ECAN regulation, 
problem awareness and internal attribution. Subjective norms represented perceived social 
pressure – descriptive and injunctive. Perceived behavioural and financial control referred to 
the perceived ease or difficulty in performing the behaviour and reflected past experiences, 
control over anticipated obstacles and the perceived impact of farm financial situations.  
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Figure 6.1 Conceptual model (adapted from Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p. 22) 
The literature presented in Chapter 2 revealed disparate findings in the impact of socio-
demographics on compliance behaviour, thereby increasing the value of contextual empirical 
studies such as this. The bivariate analysis presented in Chapter 5 tested the significance of 
variables within the five major constructs of the model in the New Zealand context. The results 
suggest that only training and farm group meeting attendance were significant predictors of 
non-compliance behaviour. Similarly, only two farm characteristics were related to compliance 
in the bivariate analysis: farm size and the number of livestock being milked. Five variables 
representing attitudes and perceptions were found to be significantly related to compliance: 
access to information, rating of the regulatory process and inspections, probability of detection 
and the group in society responsible for environmental management - with access to 
information being significantly related to compliance in the multivariate analysis. Three of the 
variables in perceived behavioural control were significantly related to compliance: confidence 
in ability to comply, intention to comply and historical compliance. None of the variables in 
perceived financial control or subjective norms were found to be significant in the bivariate 
analysis. The results from perceived financial control were surprising, given that the literature 
placed a strong emphasis on financial capability as a factor influencing compliance behaviour. 
Respondents also largely agreed that compliance was a financially exhaustive process. That 
they largely did not feel their farm financial situations or the milk payout level influenced 
compliance may suggest consent holders view the costs of compliance as a cost of doing 
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business: the benefits of being allowed to continue to operate without facing penalties outweigh 
the costs.  
Multivariate analyses were then performed using indices tested by Cronbach’s α for four major 
constructs: perceived financial control, behavioural control, subjective norms, and attitudes and 
perceptions. Six consent holder and farm characteristics variables were included in the model: 
age; years in the dairy industry; education level; information source usage index (workshop 
attendance and consultant use); farm size index (hectares and milking livestock numbers); and 
years of positive dairy operating profit. While the model had an acceptable fit, only farm size 
was found to be significant - weakly related to non-compliance at the p<0.1 level (see Section 
5.5 rationale for final model).   
The final model used a smaller set of categorical predictor variables based on the significant 
relationships identified in the bivariate analysis to gain a better indication of the effect these 
variables had on the probability of non-compliance. The variables included: number of animals 
being milked on farm (FFC); ease of access to information about requirements on farm to be 
compliant with environmental regulation (AP1); how easy respondents felt it is for ECAN to 
detect non-compliance (AP2); non-compliance would harm the respondents’ reputation (SN); 
and respondents’ confidence that they will be compliant at their next inspection (PBC). The 
graphical representation of the output from this analysis is depicted below:  
Figure 6.2 Graphical depiction of logistic regression   
 
*( p<0.1), **(p<0.02), ***(p<0.01); ****Nagelkerke R 2   
SN   
p = 0.077 *  
FFC   
p = 0.110  
AP2   
p = 0.337   
PBC   
p =  0.015**  
Log odds of ECAN  
effluent  consent  
compliance    
AP1   
p = 0.006***  0.693****  
B = 1.035  
B = 1.790  
B =  - 2.249  
B = 1.501  
B = 3.969  
 77  
  
The numerical values on the arrows are the standardised regression coefficients (B) and the 
values within the construct boxes represent their associated significance. The model in Chapter 
5 indicates that three factors are statistically significant with respect to compliance behaviour: 
access to information (a measure of attitudes and perceptions), confidence in their ability to 
comply at the next inspection (a measure of perceived behavioural control) and that 
noncompliance would harm the respondents’ reputation (a measure of subjective norms). The 
pseudo R2 of 0.693 and Hosmer and Lemeshow p-value (0.955) indicate an acceptable overall 
fit.   
This model was adjusted from the conceptual model by removing any measures of perceived 
financial control, as the survey outcome was not consistent with a priori expectations that 
financial control would have a significant positive affect on compliance. The model is not 
generalisable to other environmental regulation (see Chapter 2 regarding contextual and spatial 
differences in regulation and compliance). The model does, however, offer insight into 
compliance with effluent discharge consents on dairy farms in the Canterbury region and 
provides for a better understanding of the effect of the predictor variables (see Section 6.4) on 
the probability of non-compliance.  
6.2.10 Canterbury consent holders ‘profile’  
Survey results suggest most dairy effluent consent holders in the Canterbury region would sit 
at the bottom of the enforcement pyramid presented in RR introduced in Chapter 2: persuasion. 
The descriptive statistics showed consent holders have a strong sense of civic duty and are 
aware of the impacts of dairy farming on the environment. The results presented a cohort who 
largely understand the issues at hand and are willing, and intend, to fulfil their obligations 
through regulatory compliance.  
This profile suggests that ‘low-level’ instruments (such as providing easier access to 
information) would be more effective in increasing compliance and resonate with consent 
holders. This is consistent with results from the logistic regression and the text statements.  
Section 6.3 presents possible ‘low-level’ avenues that would be most effective.       
6.3 Recommendations  
This section provides policy and industry stakeholder recommendations to deliver on the third 
research objective. First, a discussion on Canterbury compliance rates is benchmarked against 
other regions, along with a discussion on different types of milking livestock. This is followed 
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by specific recommendations for policy and industry to help ensure compliance rates continue 
to increase.  
6.3.1 Compliance benchmarking  
When compared to other regions and industries, Canterbury had the lowest percentage of full 
compliance at first inspection, but is still in a similar range of compliance levels with effluent 
consents in other regions in New Zealand (see Table 1.1 in Chapter 1). Importantly, Canterbury 
had one the lowest rates of significant non-compliance for effluent consents in the 2014-15 
season (Bay of Plenty had the lowest at two per cent). This is important: significant 
noncompliance is what environmental agencies are trying to reduce, as it represents serious 
issues on-farm that have the potential to negatively impact the physical environment, whereas 
minor non-compliance relates more to administrative and minor technical issues. Significant 
noncompliance involves a much smaller sub-set of the population of consent holders. These are 
individuals generally at the top of the RR pyramid, that are more difficult to reach, and were 
not included in this study’s sample. Overall, Canterbury effluent consent compliance statistics 
are not dissimilar to other regions and regulations.  
6.3.2 Livestock types  
Currently, ECAN reports dairy effluent consents as a single group with emphasis placed on 
bovine dairy impacts. However, the survey revealed that at least one of the respondents had an 
effluent consent for a sheep dairy operation. Dairy goat and sheep milking operations are 
growing in New Zealand with successful niche market opportunities, however, most small 
ruminant dairies currently operate on the North Island or in Southland (Dairy Goat Cooperative, 
2016; Landcorp Farming Ltd., 2016; New Zealand Sheep Milk Co., 2014).   
Statistics on the number of small ruminants currently milked in New Zealand, let alone the 
Canterbury region, are difficult to come by likely due to the relatively small size and emerging 
nature of the industry. However, what is known, is that nutrient losses (like phosphorous and 
nitrogen) from sheep are lower than from cows, as there is less concentration in individual urine 
patches (Menneer, Ledgard & Gillingham, 2004). There has been interest in sheep milking 
documented among Canterbury farmers, as sheep milk sells for approximately four times the 
price of cow milk (The Agribusiness Group, 2015; FieldNotes, 2015). As the industry continues 
to gain attention and grow, it may be beneficial to distinguish livestock type from a reporting 
and regulating standpoint, given the differences in environmental impacts. 
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6.3.3 Policy recommendations  
This section provides recommendations for policy makers and industry stakeholders to help 
ensure that compliance rates continue to increase. It will always be difficult for a region to 
achieve 100% compliance at first inspection, as weather and unpredictable machinery 
breakdowns may impact on compliance. However, there are methods to ensure that compliance 
rates are upheld if not increased.  
6.3.3.1 Compliance rating system   
Most other regulatory agencies rely on a system to evaluate compliance that expands beyond 
compliance, minor non-compliance and significant non-compliance. It may provide value for 
ECAN to develop a rating system more similar to that of Environment Southland which rates 
compliance on a five-point scale. A stronger emphasis on the ability to comply and a priority 
rating system for risk within significant non-compliance - similar to that of Waikato Regional 
Council could also assist those rated significantly non-compliant to move towards a compliant 
status (Environment Southland, 2015; Cantley, 2014).  
One comment from a respondent highlights how some forms of minor non-compliance - such 
as those related to administrative detail rather than environmental impact - may adversely 
impact the reputation of consent holders when reported:   
“Tendency to focus on minor issues (e.g. failure to display consent) resulting in misleading 
levels of published non – compliance.”  
ECAN states that this example - having the consent document in a prominent place - ensures 
that information is, “readily accessible in the dairy shed as a constant reminder, particularly if 
key staff are not available when issues arise” (Environment Canterbury, 2015, p. 26). It may be 
more appropriate for inspectors to use their discretion so that when a consent “falls off the 
wall”, as one respondent reported as their reasoning for non-compliance, it is not considered 
an automatic failure. Further, inspectors could promote briefing of farm staff during training on 
consent conditions, where to find consent documents and how to manage issues as they arise 
and who to contact. As ECAN states, “some farms (inspected) where employees were 
questioned about the requirements of the consent conditions, they did not know anything about 
them even though this information was on the wall” (Environment Canterbury, 2015, p. 26).   
Some comments on, and reasons given for, non-compliance suggested that applying for new 
consents, rather than updating existing consents is an issue:  
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“We were non-compliant because we were irrigating more land than our consent which is good. 
Instead of just rewriting the consent, we had to do a whole new one that cost time and money.”  
As regulations and consent conditions continue to evolve, it is recommended that a system 
allowing for more fluidity when updating consents is adopted, so that consent holders do not 
feel that the process is wasteful of their time and monetary resources or that the process is 
protracted, may also provide work efficiencies for ECAN.  
6.3.3.2 Email contacts  
As is evident from the survey distribution, ECAN head office does not possess a full list of 
consent holder email addresses. Approximately 72 per cent of consents had an associated email 
address. With perceived access to information seen as a significant variable related to 
compliance, it is recommended that ECAN source a complete and frequently updated list of 
emails and fully leverage the use of electronic media by, on a consistent basis, producing 
pertinent general or region specific updates respecting regulation and proposed changes. This 
may also help alleviate uncertainty around future regulatory impacts felt by a large percentage 
of respondents in this research.  
Currently, ECAN is active on and leveraging the use of Twitter and Facebook 
(https://twitter.com/ecan; https://www.facebook.com/EnvironmentCanterbury/). However, 
given the age demographics of consent holders in this research and other research within the 
Canterbury region and as farmers are not usually known as technological enthusiasts, the use 
of these social media platforms as primary points of contact may not be reaching the majority 
of the intended audience (Murphy, 2014; Van Dalsem, 2011; Barbassa, 2010).  
6.3.3.3 Enforcement action  
During follow-up discussions, ECAN suggested that enforcement actions against significant 
non-compliant consent holders (primarily repeat offenders) may increase in future, as consent 
holders have, arguably, had a lot of time to ensure they consistently operate within their consent 
conditions (Richard Purdon, personal communication, October 18, 2016). However, Winter and 
May (2001) and May (2005), suggest that increasing deterrence measures, chiefly enforcement 
actions, may have an adverse impact on compliance. Given the profile of those surveyed and 
where they sit in the RR pyramid, penalisation may not be the appropriate response. 
Additionally, respondents voiced the view that compliance could be achieved through alternate 
engagement strategies:  
“The approach of trying to catch farmers out with short notice inspections is very threatening. 
Experience from other authorities suggests that there is better engagement where inspectors 
are working with rather than against consent holders.”  
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The Waikato Regional Council rates significant non-compliance on a priority rating system, 
focused on the distance from achieving compliance. They also provided letters in advance to 
notify consent holders that their farm will be visited sometime within the season, providing an 
opportunity for consent holders to start thinking about their systems and take remedial action 
where required (Cantley, 2014).   
Cantley (2014) suggests that Councils are restricted to only two levers of action: education and 
enforcement. In the Waikato, an emphasis was placed on engaging with consent holders who 
were significantly non-compliant, particularly during site visits. Opportunities for discussions 
were leveraged beyond a written compliance letter. Based on the risk rating, either a 
requirement for, or recommendation of, an improvement plan was specified with the 
understanding that the onus is on the consent holder to ensure plans are undertaken (Cantley, 
2014). This strategy provides an opportunity to work with the consent holders and may provide, 
as Winter and May (2001) suggest, an opportunity to increase compliance without increasing 
enforcement action.   
6.4 Study limitations, contributions and future research  
This section will discuss some of the limitations of this study, contributions and options for 
future research in the dairy effluent consent compliance sphere on Canterbury dairy farms.   
6.4.1 Study limitations  
There are several limitations to the findings in this study. One of the main limitations is to 
generalise of the findings to the wider New Zealand dairy farmer population. Different regions 
use different approaches toward the implementation of the RMA and NPS. Further, this study 
may overestimate or underestimate the variables impacting on effluent consent compliance in 
the Canterbury region. The sample, particularly in terms of non-compliant consent holders, was 
not representative of statistics presented by ECAN. Significantly non-compliant respondents 
may have been deterred from completing the survey because of the effect of subjective norms 
related to compliance, which would result in a non-response bias. Additionally, that only 48 of 
the 72 respondents commented on their reasons for their ratings of inspections and the 
regulatory process may pose a limitation. 
Other limitations relate to the survey collection method. The use of an email based survey 
excluded consent holders whose email addresses were unknown to ECAN (approximately 72 
per cent of consents had known email addresses). Also excluded were consent holders who may 
have changed their email addresses – 29 of the emails were undeliverable, or due to email 
settings, may have directed some emails to spam and/or auto-delete folders.   
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6.4.2 Study contributions  
This study probed the attitudes and perceptions of dairy effluent discharge consent holders and 
revealed several variables that are related to compliance status in the Canterbury region. An 
important part of the regulatory and legislative process to ensure there is connectedness between 
the regulated and regulating bodies. This research contributes to the body of knowledge and the 
literature on environmental regulatory compliance behaviour on farm, which is often disparate 
or conflicting given spatial and contextual differences. The findings should create opportunities 
to increase compliance in the Canterbury region by addressing the predictor variables of 
noncompliance.  
6.4.3 Future research  
Suggestions for future research include performing in-depth interviews with consent holders 
known to consistently apply best practice methods and with significantly or repeat offender 
non-compliant consent holders. An in-depth qualitative study could develop an understanding 
of the RR pyramid apex and further inform appropriate enforcement actions for significantly 
non-compliant individuals. This would help develop a deeper understanding of the motivations 
and influencing factors on compliance and behaviour. Key findings could be further 
investigated through a comparative look at other regions in New Zealand. As regulatory 
processes differ, there may be lessons to be learned from how other regulatory agencies interact 
with consent holders. There is scope to further research the impact of confidence, public 
pressure and access to information. Chiefly, what are the predictors of confidence and how do 
information sources impact on the perceived ease of access to information?    
6.5 Conclusions  
The study results showed that an investigation into the factors influencing agro-environmental 
compliance on this particular sub-group should not focus exclusively on socio-demographics 
or operational characteristics, but should include in-depth considerations of attitudes and 
perceptions, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control. Results indicated that access 
to information and perceived behavioural control variables like confidence and intention to 
comply were strongly associated with compliance. Only a handful of significant relationships 
existed between other major constructs and compliance. Respondents’ comments indicated that 
current regulation and its related processes lack engagement with the dairy farming community 
and experiences with inspections are varied. Recommendation options to increase access to 
information, ameliorate feelings of uncertainty and promote engagement between consent 
holders and regulators were provided, which may help ensure compliance levels continue to 
increase and remain comparable to other regions in New Zealand.     
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Appendix B 
Constructs and proxies of conceptual model 
  
Explanatory variables                         Description Expected impact  
Farm and farmer characteristics   
Ownership structure  Structure of farm ownership: sole proprietor, 
partnership, corporate etc.   
(+)/(-)  
Age  Biological age   (+)/(-)  
Ethnicity  Ethnic identity  (+)/(-)  
Gender  Dummy variable for male (0) and female (1)  (+)/(-)  
Years in industry  Number of years farming  (+)/(-)  
Education  Level of formal education  (+)  
Access to information  Use of consultant for farm planning; attendance to 
training activities and workshops; use of extension 
(DairyNZ) services  
(+)  
Dairy operating profit (Farm 
Economic Surplus)  
Years’ operating in a surplus  (+)  
Farm size  Farm size in hectares of land  (+)  
Herd size  Number of cows being milked  (+)  
Catchment   Water quality issues vary by district: identify which 
catchment the respondent is operating in  
(+)/(-)  
Attitudes and perceptions    
Environment  Pro-environmental perceptions   (+)  
Equity  Equity perceptions on spread of cost burden and 
fairness  
(+)  
Regulation  Perceptions of regulatory complexity, structure and 
uncertainty   
(+)  
Problem awareness  Awareness of water quality issues and agricultural 
linkages  
(+)  
Internal attribution  Perception of farm role in water quality issues  (+)  
Subjective norms    
Descriptive social norm  Perceptions of behaviours approved by others  (+)  
Injunctive social norm  Perceptions of how other people are actually 
behaving  
(+)  
Perceived behavioural control    
PBC             Belief in ability to succeed, control over behaviour 
and past experience 
(+) 
Perceived financial control  
Payout and financial situations  Perceptions of ability to comply in 
different payout levels and financial 
situations 
(+) 
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Appendix C 
Online questionnaire 
Q1 Farm ownership structure (please tick appropriate box)  
 Sole proprietorship (1)  
 Partnership (2)  
 Corporation/Company (3)  Trust (4)  
 Māori Trust/Incorporation (5)  Other (6)  
Answer If: Farm ownership structure (please tick appropriate box) other please specify:  
Is Selected Q1.1 Please specify other ownership structure Q2 Gender (please tick 
appropriate box)  
 Male (1)  
 Female (2)  
Q3 Age (please tick appropriate box)  
 Less than 25 years old (1)  
 26-35 years old (2)  
 36-45 years old (3)  
 46-55 years old (4)  
 56-65 years old (5)  
 66-75 years old (6)  
 76+ years old (7)  
Q4   Ethnicity (please tick appropriate box)  
 European New Zealander (1)  
 Māori (2)  
 Asian (3)  
 Pacific (4)  
 Other (5)  
Answer If: Ethnicity (please tick appropriate box) Other Is Selected  
Q4.1 Please specify ethnicity  
  
Q5 Number of years actively involved in dairy farming in New Zealand (please tick 
appropriate box)  
 1-2 years (1)  
 3-5 years (2)  
 6-10 years (3)  
 11-15 years (4)  
 16-20 years (5)  
 21-25 years (6)  
 26+years (7)  
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Q6 Highest level of formal education achieved (please tick appropriate box)  
 High school or equivalent (1)  
 Primary ITO/Polytechnic/Diploma (2)  
 Undergraduate degree (3)  
 Post-Graduate degree (4)  
 Other (5)  
Answer If: Highest level of formal education achieved (please tick appropriate box)   
Other Is Selected  
Q6.1 Please specify highest level of formal education  
 
Q7 Are there any other parties with significant involvement in farm-decision making 
regarding effluent management (i.e. partner, children, farm manager etc.)?  
 Yes (1)  
 No (2)  
Answer If: Are there any other parties with significant involvement in farm-decision 
making regarding effluent management? Yes Is Selected  
 
Q7.1 Please specify the other parties  
 
Q8 Which catchment do you primarily operate in (please tick appropriate box)?  
 Hurunui-Waiau (1)  
 Waimakariri (2)  
 Christchurch - West Melton (3)  
 Banks Peninsula (4)  
 Selwyn - Waihora (5)  
 Ashburton (6)  
 Orari-Opihi-Pareora (7)  
 Lower Waitaki (8)  
 Upper Waitaki (9)  
 Kaikoura (10)  
   
Q9 Number of cows milked on farm (please tick appropriate box)  
 Less than 100 (1)  
 100-250 (2)  
 250-500 (3)  
 500-750 (4)  
 750-1000 (5)  
 1000+ (6)  
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Q10 Approximate farm size in hectares  
 Less than 100 (1)  
 100-250 (2)  
 250-500 (3)  
 500-750 (4)  
 750-1000 (5)  1000+ (6)  
Q11 How often do you attend training workshops or farm group meetings?  
 Seldom to never (1)  
 Once every couple of years (2)  
 Once a year (3)  
 Several times a year (4)  
 Once a month (5)  
Q12 How often do you use consultancy and/or extension services (DairyNZ consulting) for 
your farm planning?  
 Never (1)  
 Once every couple years (2)  
 Once a year (3)  
 Several times a year (4)  
Answer If: How often do you use consultancy and/or extension services (DairyNZ 
consulting) for your farm planning? Never Is Not Selected Q12.1 Please indicate which of 
the following services your consultant(s) provide (can be more than one)  
 Regular farm supervision and week to week management advice (1)  
 Periodic feed budgeting (2)  
 Whole farm strategic output (3)  
 Financial/farm business advice (4)  
 Environmental performance (5)  
 Other (6)  
    
Answer If: Please indicate which of the following services your consultant(s) provide (can 
be more than one) Other Is Selected Q12.2 Please specify what services your consultant(s) 
provide  
 
Q13 Over the past 5 seasons, approximately how many times has your dairy operating 
profit been positive?  
 None (1)  
 1 (2)  
 2 (3)  
 3 (4)  
 4 (5)  
 5 (6)  
   
 99  
  
 
Q14-31 Please indicate whether you STRONGLY AGREE, AGREE, are NEUTRAL, 
DISAGREE or STRONGLY DISAGREE with the following statements  
  Strongly 
agree (1)  
Agree  
(2)  
Neutral  
(3)  
Disagree  
(4)  
Strongly 
disagree (5)  
Canterbury farmers are 
unfairly impacted by 
environmental 
regulation.  
               
Nitrate limits are fairly 
applied to all farmers.  
               
Environmental 
regulation in Canterbury 
has a fair and equitable 
impact on all farmers.  
               
The cost of 
environmental 
protection is equitable 
across society in 
Canterbury.   
               
Environment Canterbury 
makes it easy to 
understand why farmers 
should be compliant.  
               
I have easy access to 
information about 
requirements on farm to 
be compliant with 
environmental 
regulation.  
               
I am informed on farm 
environmental 
regulation in 
Canterbury.  
               
I feel uncertain about 
future regulatory 
restrictions on my farm.  
               
Achieving and 
maintaining compliance 
requires a lot of my 
time.  
               
Achieving compliance 
costs a lot of money.  
               
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Inspections by  
Environment  
Canterbury are frequent 
enough to deter most 
farmers from violating 
their resource consents.  
               
My farming practices 
did not contribute to the 
need for environmental 
regulation on farm.  
    
I intend to comply with 
my resource consent 
conditions because of 
the potential penalty. 
    
Water quality can 
impact on human health. 
    
Water quality can affect 
the quality of my pasture 
and/or crops. 
    
Water quality can affect 
the health of my 
livestock. 
    
Dairy farming impacts 
surface and ground 
water quality. 
    
Environmental 
regulation on farm was 
necessary to do 
something about water 
quality. 
    
 
Q32-35 Please state how concerned you are about practices that impact the natural 
environment because of potential consequences for the following: 
 Not very 
concerning 
(1) 
Not 
concerning 
(2) 
Neutral (3) Concerning 
(4)  
Very 
concerning 
(5) 
Native 
animals 
     
Native plants      
Native birds     
Native fish     
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Q36-40 Please state how threatening the following problems are to the physical 
environment:  
 Not very 
threatening 
(1) 
Not 
threatening 
(2) 
Neutral (3) Threatening 
(4)  
Very 
threatening 
(5) 
Degraded 
soil health 
     
Weeds      
Poor water 
quality 
    
Limited 
water supply 
    
Adverse 
weather 
conditions 
    
 
 Q41 What group in society should have primary responsibility for looking after the 
environment in a sustainable manner (please tick ONE answer that most suits you)  
 National or local government (1)  
 Business and industry (2)  
 Private landowners (3)  
 Environmental groups (4)  
 Everyone (government, industry, landowners, the public, etc.) (5)  
 No one (6)  
 Other (7)  
Answer If: What group in society should have primary responsibility for looking after the 
environment in a sustainable manner (please tick ONE answer that most suits you) Other 
Is Selected  
Q41.1 Please specify what group in society should have primary responsibility for looking 
after the environment in a sustainable manner  
 
Q42 What method of intervention provides the best results in reducing nitrate leaching 
on farm?  
 Voluntary (farmer-driven) (1)  
 Market-driven (2)  
 Mix of voluntary and market-driven (3)  
 Mix of voluntary and government regulation (4)  
 Mix of market-driven and government regulation (5)  
 Mix of voluntary, market and government regulation (6)  Government regulation with 
penalties for non-action (7)  
Q43 How easy do you believe it is for ECAN to detect non-compliance?  
 Extremely easy (1)  
 Somewhat easy (2)  
 Neither easy nor difficult (3)  
 Somewhat difficult (4)  Extremely difficult (5)  
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Q44 If detected being non-compliant, how likely is it that a farmer would be penalised?  
 Extremely likely (1)  
 Somewhat likely (2)  
 Neither likely nor unlikely (3)  
 Somewhat unlikely (4)  
 Extremely unlikely (5)  
  
Q45 Please rate your experience with ECAN inspections.  
 Excellent (1)  
 Good (2)  
 Average (3)  
 Poor (4)  
 Terrible (5)  
Q46 Please rate your experience with the ECAN regulatory process.  
 Excellent (1)  
 Good (2)  
 Average (3)  
 Poor (4)  
 Terrible (5)  
Q47 Please provide a few sentences on what influenced your rating in the previous TWO 
questions.  
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Q48-61 Please indicate whether you STRONGLY AGREE, AGREE, are NEUTRAL, 
DISAGREE or STRONGLY DISAGREE with the following statements  
  Strongly 
agree (1)  
Agree (2)  Neutral  
(3)  
Disagree  
(4)  
Strongly 
disagree (5)  
The majority of 
farmers in New 
Zealand usually 
comply with their 
effluent consents.   
               
Among the farmers I 
know, most are 
compliant most of time.  
               
Occasional 
noncompliance is 
common.  
               
If I am not compliant 
with my effluent 
consent my reputation 
as a farmer would be 
harmed.  
               
Operating the way the 
public thinks I should 
regarding my effluent 
consent is important to 
me.  
               
Other farmers would 
disapprove if I was not 
compliant with my 
effluent consent.  
               
I feel pressure from 
the farming 
community to comply 
with environmental 
regulations.  
               
People who are 
important to me, like 
friends and family, 
would disapprove if I 
was not compliant.  
               
I am confident that I 
will be compliant with 
my effluent discharge 
consent at my next 
inspection.  
               
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I intend to be 
compliant at the time 
of my inspection.  
               
In the past 5 seasons 
(or seasons since 
application approval 
for consent) I have 
been compliant. 
              
The fate of the farm is 
mostly determined by 
factors outside of my 
control. 
              
In a low payout 
situation, I am less 
likely to be able to 
comply with my 
effluent consent than in 
a high or average 
payout. 
              
The ability of farmers 
to comply with effluent 
consents relies heavily 
on farm financial 
situations 
              
 
Q62 Effluent consent compliance level at time of last inspection (please tick appropriate 
box)  
 Compliant (1)  
 Minor non-compliance (2)  
 Significant non-compliance (3)  
Answer If: Effluent consent compliance level at time of last inspection (please tick 
appropriate box) Compliant Is Not Selected  
Q62.1 Type of non-compliance  
 Ponding of effluent (1)  
 Exceeding application rate (2)  
 Exceeding number of cows being milked (3)  
 Storage pond not meeting requirements (4)  Other (5)  
Answer If: Type of non-compliance Other Is Selected  
Q62.2 Please specify type of non-compliance Answer If:  Effluent consent compliance level 
at time of last inspection (please tick appropriate box) Compliant Is Not Selected  
Q62.3 Please comment on reason for non-compliance (i.e. equipment issues, management, 
weather, etc.)  
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Appendix D 
Lincoln University Human Ethics Committee approval 
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Appendix E  
Details of variable transformations 
 
E.1 Details of consent holder and farm variable transformations 
Note the original variables are on the left of each table. Parentheses denotes the number of 
categories or groups and n is the number of respondents. 
 
Table E.1 Education 
Education (5) n Education (2) n 
None 1 Polytech or lower 38 
High school or equivalent 15 Undergraduate or higher 31 
Polytech/Diploma/Primary ITO 22   
Undergraduate degree 27   
Post-graduate degree 4   
 
Table E.2 Consultant use 
Consultant use (4) n Consultant use (2) n 
Never 11 Seldom 26 
Once every couple years 15 Often 42 
Once a year 4   
Several times a year 38   
 
Table E.3 Training 
Training (5) n Training (2) n 
Seldom to never 9 Seldom 23 
Once every couple years 14 Often 46 
Once a year 9   
Several times a year 34   
Once a month 3   
 
Table E.4 Livestock milked 
Livestock milked (6) n Livestock milked (2) n 
Less than 100 1 Less than 750 31 
100-250 5 More than 750 39 
250-500 9   
500-750 16   
750-1000 18   
1000+ 21   
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Table E.5 Farm size 
Farm size (6) n Farm size (2) n 
 
Less than 100 4 Less than 500 59 
100-250 26 More than 500 9 
250-500 29   
500-750 5   
750-1000 3   
1000+ 1   
 
E.2 Attitudes and perceptions 
Table E.6 Dairy impacts 
Dairy impacts (5) n Dairy impacts (2) n 
 
Strongly agree 8 Agree 34 
Agree 26 Neutral/Disagree 34 
Neutral 22   
Disagree 9   
Strongly disagree 3   
 
Table E.7 Water quality: Human health 
Water quality: Human 
health (4) 
n Water quality: Human 
health (2) 
n 
 
Strongly agree 22 Agree 57 
Agree 35 Neutral/Disagree 11 
Neutral 9   
Disagree 2   
 
Table E.8 Water quality: Livestock health 
Water quality: Livestock 
health (5) 
n Water quality: 
Livestock health (2) 
n 
 
Strongly agree 15 Agree 51 
Agree 36 Neutral/Disagree 17 
Neutral 10   
Disagree 6   
Strongly disagree 1   
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Table E.9 Water quality: Pasture/crop health 
Water quality: 
Pasture/crop health (5) 
n Water quality: 
Pasture/crop health (2) 
n 
 
Strongly agree 12 Agree 33 
Agree 21 Neutral/Disagree 34 
Neutral 15   
Disagree 16   
Strongly disagree 3   
 
Table E.10 Regulation required to improve water quality 
Regulation required (5) n Regulation required (2) n 
 
Strongly agree 6 Agree 44 
Agree 38 Neutral/Disagree 24 
Neutral 17   
Disagree 4   
Strongly disagree 3   
 
Table E.11 Biospheric concern 
Biospheric concern (7) n Biospheric concern (2) n 
 
Not very concerning 1 Not very concerning - 
Neutral 
23 
Not concerning 8 Neutral-concerning – 
very concerning 
35 
Neutral 14   
Neutral-concerning 6   
Concerning 33   
Concerning-very 
concerning 
3   
Very concerning 2   
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Table E.12 Environmental risks 
Environmental risks 
 (8) 
n Environmental risks 
 (2) 
n 
 
Not very threatening 1 Not very threatening – 
neutral 
17 
Not threatening 2 Threatening 50 
Not threatening -neutral 2   
Neutral 12   
Neutral-threatening 12   
Threatening 27   
Threatening – very 
threatening 
7   
Very threatening 4   
 
Table E.13 Canterbury farmers unfairly impacted  
Canterbury farmers 
unfairly impacted (4) 
n Canterbury farmers 
unfairly impacted (2) 
n 
 
Strongly agree 11 Agree 36 
Agree 25 Neutral/Disagree 32 
Neutral 18   
Disagree 14   
 
Table E.14 Nitrate limits applied fairly  
Nitrate limits applied 
fairly (5) 
n Nitrate limits applied 
fairly (2) 
n 
 
Strongly agree 1 Agree 13 
Agree 12 Neutral/Disagree 54 
Neutral 15   
Disagree 29   
Strongly disagree 10   
 
Table E.15 Regulation fair to all farmers 
Regulation fair to all 
farmers (5) 
n Regulation fair to all 
farmers (2) 
n 
 
Strongly agree 1 Agree 13 
Agree 12 Neutral/Disagree 55 
Neutral 12   
Disagree 33   
Strongly disagree 10   
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Table E.16 Equitable cost spread 
Equitable cost spread 
(5) 
n Equitable cost spread 
(2) 
n 
 
Strongly agree 1 Agree 7 
Agree 6 Neutral/Disagree 61 
Neutral 11   
Disagree 34   
Strongly disagree 16   
 
Table E.17 Easy to understand need for compliance 
Easy to understand 
need for compliance 
(5) 
n Easy to understand 
need for compliance 
(2) 
n 
 
Strongly agree 5 Agree 38 
Agree 34 Neutral/Disagree 30 
Neutral 8   
Disagree 14   
Strongly disagree 7   
 
Table E.18 Easy access to information  
Easy access to 
information (5) 
n Easy access to 
information (2) 
n 
 
Strongly agree 5 Agree 47 
Agree 34 Neutral/Disagree 21 
Neutral 8   
Disagree 14   
Strongly disagree 7   
 
Table E.19 I am informed on regulation 
I am informed on 
regulation (5) 
n I am informed on 
regulation (2) 
n 
 
Strongly agree 4 Agree 57 
Agree 42 Neutral/Disagree 11 
Neutral 11   
Disagree 9   
Strongly disagree 2   
 
  
 111  
  
Table E.20 Future regulation uncertainty 
Future regulation 
uncertainty (5) 
n Future regulation 
uncertainty (2) 
n 
 
Strongly agree 20 Agree 61 
Agree 28 Neutral/Disagree 7 
Neutral 13   
Disagree 4   
Strongly disagree 3   
 
Table E.21 Compliance takes a lot of time 
Compliance takes a 
lot of time (4) 
n Compliance takes a 
lot of time (2) 
n 
 
Strongly agree 19 Agree/Neutral 61 
Agree 37 Disagree 1 
Neutral 11   
Disagree 1   
 
Table E.22 Compliance takes a lot of money 
Compliance takes a 
lot of money (4) 
n Compliance takes a 
lot of money (2) 
n 
 
Strongly agree 25 Agree/Neutral 65 
Agree 33 Disagree 2 
Neutral 7   
Disagree 2   
 
Table E.23 Inspections frequent enough to deter violations 
Inspections frequent 
enough to deter 
violations (5) 
n Inspections frequent 
enough to deter 
violations (2) 
n 
 
Strongly agree 9 Agree 47 
Agree 38 Neutral/Disagree 21 
Neutral 14   
Disagree 6   
Strongly disagree 1   
 
Table E.24 I intend to comply due to potential penalty 
I intend to comply 
due to potential 
penalty (4) 
n I intend to comply due 
to potential penalty 
(2) 
n 
 
Strongly agree 21 Agree 51 
Agree 30 Neutral/Disagree 16 
Neutral 6   
Disagree 10   
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Table E.25 Method that provides best results 
Method that provides 
best results (5) 
n Method that provides 
best results (2) 
n 
 
Voluntary 6 With legislation 44 
Market-driven 2 Without legislation 21 
Mix of voluntary and 
market driven 
13   
Mix of voluntary and 
government 
15   
Mix of market and 
government 
4   
Mix of all three 25   
 
E.3 Subjective norms 
Table E.26 Reputation 
Reputation (4) n Reputation (2) n 
 
Strongly agree 29 Agree 58 
Agree 29 Neutral/Disagree 9 
Neutral 7   
Disagree 2   
 
Table E.27 Operating the way the public expects  
Operating the way the 
public expects (5) 
n Operating the way 
the public expects (2) 
n 
 
Strongly agree 23 Agree 48 
Agree 25 Neutral/Disagree 19 
Neutral 15   
Disagree 2   
Strongly disagree 2   
 
Table E.28 Other farmers would disapprove  
Other farmers would 
disapprove (4) 
n Other farmers would 
disapprove (2) 
n 
 
Strongly agree 18 Agree 56 
Agree 38 Neutral/Disagree 10 
Neutral 7   
Disagree 3   
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Table E.29 Pressure from farming community  
Pressure from 
farming community 
(4) 
n Pressure from 
farming community 
(2) 
n 
 
Strongly agree 14 Agree 40 
Agree 26 Neutral/Disagree 27 
Neutral 22   
Disagree 5   
 
Table E.30 Friends and family would disapprove  
Friends and family 
would disapprove (5) 
n Friends and family 
would disapprove (2) 
n 
 
Strongly agree 19 Agree 54 
Agree 35 Neutral/Disagree 13 
Neutral 11   
Disagree 1   
Strongly disagree 1   
 
Table E.31 Majority of farmers usually comply  
Majority of farmers 
usually comply (3) 
n Majority of farmers 
usually comply (2) 
n 
 
Strongly agree 24 Agree 64 
Agree 40 Neutral 3 
Neutral 3   
 
Table E.32 Most farmers I know are compliant  
Most farmers I know 
are compliant (4) 
n Most farmers I know 
are compliant (2) 
n 
 
Strongly agree 31 Agree 62 
Agree 31 Neutral/Disagree 5 
Neutral 4   
Strongly disagree 1   
 
Table E.33 Occasional non-compliance common  
Occasional non-
compliance common (5) 
n Occasional non-
compliance common (2) 
n 
 
Strongly agree 2 Agree/Neutral 46 
Agree 25 Disagree 21 
Neutral 19   
Disagree 18   
Strongly disagree 3   
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E.4 Perceived behavioural control 
Table E.34 Historical compliance 
Historical compliance 
(4) 
n Historical compliance 
(2) 
n 
 
Strongly agree 36 Agree 55 
Agree 19 Neutral/Disagree 11 
Neutral 4   
Disagree 7   
 
Table E.35 Locus of control 
Locus of control (5) n Locus of control (2) n 
 
Strongly agree 6 Agree/Neutral 39 
Agree 11 Disagree 28 
Neutral 22   
Disagree 23   
Strongly disagree 5   
 
E.5 Perceived financial control 
Table E.36 Payout 
Payout (5) n Payout (2) n 
 
Strongly agree 5 Agree/Neutral 17 
Agree 7 Disagree 50 
Neutral 5   
Disagree 32   
Strongly disagree 18   
 
Table E.37 Farm financial situation 
Farm financial 
situation (5) 
n Farm financial 
situation (2) 
n 
 
Strongly agree 6 Agree/Neutral 31 
Agree 13 Disagree 36 
Neutral 12   
Disagree 24   
Strongly disagree 12   
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Appendix F 
Cross tabulations of significant relationships 
 
Table F.1 What group in society should have the primary responsibility of looking after the 
environment sustainably? 
 
Effluent consent compliance level at 
time of last inspection 
Total Compliant Non-compliant 
 National or local government 8 2 10 
Private landowners 3 1 4 
Everyone 49 3 52 
No one 0 1 1 
Total 60 7 67 
 
Table F.2 Workshop/training attendance 
 
Effluent consent compliance level at time of last inspection 
Total Compliant Non-compliant 
 Seldom 23 0 23 
Often 37 7 44 
Total 60 7 67 
 
Table F.3 Farm size in hectares 
 
Effluent consent compliance level at time of last 
inspection 
Total Compliant Non-compliant 
 Less than 500 52 4 56 
More than 500 6 3 9 
Total 58 7 65 
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Table F.4 Number of livestock being milked 
 
Effluent consent compliance level at time of last 
inspection 
Total Compliant Non-compliant 
 Less than 
100 
1 0 1 
100-250 5 0 5 
250-500 8 0 8 
500-750 13 2 15 
750-1000 18 0 18 
1000+ 15 5 20 
Total 60 7 67 
 
Table F.5 I Easy access to information  
 
Effluent consent compliance level at time of last 
inspection 
Total Compliant Non-compliant 
 Agree/Neutral 45 1 46 
Disagree 15 6 21 
Total 60 7 67 
 
Table F.6 Historical compliance 
 
Effluent consent compliance level at time of last 
inspection 
Total Compliant Non-compliant 
 Agree 52 3 55 
Neutral/Disagree 7 4 11 
Total 59 7 66 
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Table F.7 Intention 
 
Effluent consent compliance level at time of last 
inspection 
Total Compliant 
Non-
compliant 
 Strongly 
agree 
48 2 50 
Agree 11 5 16 
Total 59 7 66 
 
Table F.8 Confidence  
 
Effluent consent compliance level at time of last 
inspection 
Total Compliant Non-compliant 
 Strongly 
agree 
45 1 46 
Agree 14 6 20 
Total 59 7 66 
 
Table F.9 Rating of experience with ECAN inspections 
 
Effluent consent compliance level at time of last 
inspection 
Total Compliant Non-compliant 
 Excellent 11 0 11 
Good 33 3 36 
Average 11 2 13 
Poor 3 2 5 
Terrible 2 0 2 
Total 60 7 67 
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Table F.10 Rating of experience with the ECAN regulatory process 
 
Effluent consent compliance level at time of last 
inspection 
Total Compliant Non-compliant 
 Excellent 4 0 4 
Good 23 1 24 
Average 25 3 28 
Poor 5 2 7 
Terrible 3 1 4 
Total 60 7 67 
 
Table F.11 ECAN’s ease at detecting non-compliance 
  
Effluent consent compliance level at time of 
last inspection 
Total Compliant Non-compliant 
 Extremely easy 8 1 9 
Somewhat easy 18 0 18 
Neither easy nor 
difficult 
24 2 26 
Somewhat difficult 8 4 12 
Extremely difficult 2 0 2 
Total 60 7 67 
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Appendix G  
Qualitative responses 
Table G.1: Positive comments on ECAN inspections and regulation 
Tone and topic Comment 
Positive: 
Regulation 
implementation 
process 
Count = 2 
 “So far getting consents through and advice on native planting 
season and plans have been well looked after and pretty straight 
forward.” 
 “Had a non-compliance on water take which was handled well by 
ECAN.” 
Positive: 
Inspections 
Count = 18 
 “We have got on good with the inspectors as we try our best to do 
the job right.” 
 “Fair and reasonable assessment, good dialogue with assessor prior 
to final report, collaborative approach.” 
 “Respectful staff.” 
 “Always have had good discussion with inspecting officers on 
farm.” 
 “In most cases the standard and competency of the audits and 
auditors was good.” 
 “Overall good experience.” 
 “I have never had any problems in dealing with inspectors.” 
 “Farm inspections are thorough and professional.” 
 “Generally the people involved have good interpersonal skills. 
ECAN are using a mix of carrot and stick.” 
 “Very friendly and understanding staff.” 
 “Never had a problem with effluent inspections.” 
 “On most occasions staff have been thorough and polite and offered 
good advice on any minor compliance issues.” 
 “ECAN staff have always been good to deal with.” 
 “For the most part, ECAN inspections of effluent and water use 
have been good.” 
 “Nice inspectors, no nonsense.” 
 “Fairly good to deal with.” 
 “Individual inspectors have generally been very good, but there can 
be variation between their personal approaches.” 
 “ECAN staff that have visited our farms have always been 
courteous, interested in what we are doing and ready to offer advice 
if sought.” 
Positive: Other 
Count = 2 
 “No problems with ECAN.” 
 “Helpful, easy to understand.” 
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Table G.2: Negative comments on ECAN inspections and regulation 
Tone and topic Comment 
Negative: 
Regulation 
Count =11 
 “ECAN is going through the motion ticking the boxes. They are not 
interested in science measurement on farm.” 
 “Not based on sound science.” 
 “Confusing rules and changing goals all the time.” 
 “Regulations need to be based on real science not assumed science. 
More research needed, not using assumptions.” 
 “I feel that they are still trying to have a one system fits all policy 
going, however, this just isn't the case.” 
 “Regulatory process moves to slowly and needs to be based on 
good science.” 
 “Keep moving the goalposts.” 
 “Understanding what ECAN is after: The goalposts are shifting all 
the time, no consistency.” 
 “ECAN has been over-reactive concerning use of accretion land.” 
 “ECAN takes everything very black and white. There is not much 
experience with different type of farming systems (i.e. free stall).” 
 “Regulatory processes are fine but very unfair when we have 
neighbours both above and below us seemingly on different rules 
regarding stock in waterways with beef cattle and dairy grazing 
operations.” 
Negative: 
Regulation 
implementation 
process 
Count = 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 “They come around once a year, we have always been reasonably 
compliant and so never have a problem, but I know of farmers who 
do not practice best practice and nothing is ever done.” 
 “We were non-compliant because we were irrigating more land 
than our consent which is good. Instead of just rewriting the 
consent, we had to do a whole new one that cost time and money.” 
 “They do an okay job now after doing a poor regulatory job for 
years, this has led to poor compliance that is now biting them back. 
They are now catching up which is good, but being a bit too 
officious and probably need to work with farmers rather than 
against us, which is disappointing.” 
 “We had a massive problem with ECAN regarding a water consent 
which cost us many thousands of dollars with a lawyer and stress 
which impacted on my farming operation.” 
 “I was recently (previous season) fined for significant non-
compliance. The process was very stressful and totally out of 
context to the offence.” 
 “Tendency to focus on minor issues (e.g. failure to display consent) 
resulting in misleading levels of published non – compliance.” 
 “A lot of cost and time taken to get/renew consents.” 
 “The regulatory process is somewhat complicated.” 
 “Poor communication from ECAN to farmers of policy, regulations 
and amended requirements.” 
 “Admin at ECAN is terrifyingly inefficient and therefore expensive 
to the rating base.” 
 “Regulatory process has at various times been very protracted, 
appearing wasteful of time and monetary resources, to achieve the 
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same outcome as was initially applied for. Very expensive to justify 
any changes to a resource consent, and difficult to keep up with 
environmental changes that occur during a consent change process.” 
Negative: 
Inspections 
Count = 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 “Dealing with some staff difficult due to their inexperience. Seems 
to be   high turnover of staff.” 
 “Last inspection didn't even bother to go to the effluent irrigator. 
Information very slow in coming and mixed messages.” 
 “The inspectors have been extremely pedantic in classifying farms 
as non-compliant for very small offences.” 
 “Individuals could be more customer focused and helpful.” 
 “Terrible because of incompetence of inspector.” 
 “The approach of trying to catch farmers out with short notice 
inspections is very threatening. Experience from other authorities 
suggests that there is better engagement where inspectors are 
working with rather than against consent holders.” 
 “The monitoring staff are young and inexperienced and on the right 
side of environmentalism i.e. not neutral.” 
 “A bit of common sense needed with inspections.” 
 “An aggressive attitude of inspectors with very poor practical skills. 
Consenting staff also lack common sense.” 
 “Regulatory process turned very, very expensive for me on our 
recent conversion. Generally, I think we have a great relationship 
with ECAN, but unfortunately red tape just seems to get more and 
more expensive.” 
 “Have been totally compliant on both farms for years, yet still get 
treated like a criminal with no notice given for annual checks.” 
 “Inspectors could often be more knowledgeable, seem to look to 
tick boxes rather than looking deeper into how systems are 
operated.” 
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Table G.3: Other comments on ECAN inspections and regulation 
Tone  Comment 
Improving 
Count = 2 
 “They have changed from being only regulatory and somewhat 
unhelpful to being very helpful.” 
 “Attitudes of ECAN staff have improved over the last few years, able 
to work with the consent holder.” 
Other 
Count = 2 
 “Limited interactions.” 
 “They only did what was necessary.” 
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Appendix H  
Constructs Cronbach’s α 
Table H.1 Cronbach’s α values 
Construct Cronbach’s α 
Information access source usage 0.631 
Size  0.785 
Attitudes 0.564 
Subjective norms 0.713 
Perceived behavioural control 0.734 
Perceived financial control 0.808 
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Appendix I  
Logistic regression evaluation of conceptual model 
 
Table I.1 Logistic regression results of conceptual model 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 AGE -1.259 1.357 .860 1 .354 .284 
YEARS IN 
INDUSTRY 
-.572 .922 .384 1 .535 .564 
EDU LEVEL -2.152 2.735 .619 1 .431 .116 
SIZEAVG 3.014 1.799 2.807 1 .094* 20.376 
INFOAVG -.437 1.727 .064 1 .800 .646 
PROFIT 1.891 2.044 .856 1 .355 6.624 
ATTITUDEAVG 10.203 9.434 1.170 1 .279 26986.516 
SNAVG 2.557 2.502 1.044 1 .307 12.893 
PBCAVG 4.869 3.777 1.661 1 .197 130.169 
PFCAVG -1.798 1.488 1.459 1 .227 .166 
Constant -43.105 27.428 2.470 1 .116 .000 
*p<0.1 
 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell 
R Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
12.535 .347 .749 
 
 
 
